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3Abstract 
China’s stock market is the world’s youngest one and the fastest-growing one as well.  
During the past decade, it has been developed with a variety of unique features, most of which 
are inconsistent with the concept of a viable market economy.  China’s dualist regulatory 
regime has different sets of rules for domestic participants and foreign investors.  For a long 
period, foreign investment in the stock market was subject to severe restrictions and 
effectively excluded from all market activities except in the B shares market.  Fundamental 
changes, however, have occurred following China’s accession to the WTO, especially in the 
last two years.  Now qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) are allowed participate in 
the market, as are foreign firms that wish to acquire Chinese enterprises including listed SOEs.  
This article, after introducing China’s existing legal rules on foreign participation in the stock 
market, analyzes the major legal and corporate governance obstacles facing foreign investors.  
It concludes that, in order to achieve the ambition to make its stock market one of the most 
successful in the world and to meet its WTO obligations, China needs to substantially improve 
its regulatory and legal framework and adjust to different regulatory philosophies, including 
rethinking the role of foreign investors, redefining the role and functions of government with 
a view to providing institutions supporting the market, and creating real good corporate 
governance for listed companies.  To achieve this, the key is to accelerate privatization, which 
has picked up speed in 2003.
4INTRODUCTION
Nobel laureate and economist John Hicks suggested that financial markets should 
be considered as one of the causes of the surge in economic growth over the past two 
centuries, claiming that “the Industrial Revolution would have been impossible without the 
concurrent development of financial markets.”1 The World Bank, in its authoritative
World Development Report, confirmed the finding of Hicks and concluded that financial 
development was central to economic growth and poverty reduction.2
The effective functioning of financial markets and financial systems depends upon 
sound financial institutions, which include banks, insurance companies, provident and 
pension funds, investment and pooled investment schemes (mutual funds), compulsory 
saving schemes, and securities markets.3  Financial institutions help facilitate private and 
official capital flows, channel investment and resources to their most efficient and 
productive uses, encourage technological innovations, and in so doing, perform the 
functions of shifting risk to those who are willing to bear it, as well as reducing the 
information costs of making transactions in market economies.4
1 See HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 290-91 (McGraw-
Hill/Irwin 2001).  The rationale was that the Industrial Revolution was characterized by a sharp rise in the 
use of machinery and other capital goods, which needed to be sustained by large investment.  “Such 
Investment in turn required the mobilization of large amount of saving, which would have been impossible 
without the creation of liquid financial assets.” See id, at 291.
2 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002, at 75-76 (online PDF version, available 
at http://www.worldbank.org) (hereinafter WDR 2002).
3 See id, at 76.  
4 See id, at 75.
5In addition to foreign direct investment (FDI), bank borrowing and lending, an d 
bond issuance, developing stock markets is regarded as one of the most important 
alternative funding sources, which is especially useful to developing countries including
the People’s Republic of China (China or PRC), the largest one in this group.5  As the 
World Bank has noted, “as the stock market develops and strengthens, it benefits other 
parts of the financial sector as well as the wider economy.”6
The world’s sixth largest and fastest growing economy,7 China has a relatively 
small stock market.  However, since China’s securities market is the world’s youngest one 
as well, its pace of expansion is impressive.  The Chinese stock market deserves
international attention by virtue of two features:  First, it is the only stock market in the 
world in which an overwhelming majority of listed companies are state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs).8  Second, it represents one of the world’s biggest privatization movements, as
China’s SOEs have been gradually privatized through issuing stocks to private citizens and 
5 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999/2000, at 83 (online PDF version 
available at http://www.worldbank.org) (hereinafter WDR 2000).
6 See id, at 84.
7
  According to the World Development Indicators of World Bank, China’s GDP in 2002 was US$ 1,237 
Billion, ranking No.6 behind USA, Japan, Germany, France, and British.  See Total GNP 2002, Quick 
Reference Tables of the World Development Indicators Database (2003), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/quickreference/quickref.html.
8
 In the 1273 listed companies in China’s stock markets, only about a hundred of them are privately owned.  
See the database of China’s listed companies on the website of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) at http://www.csrc.gov.cn.  See also Li Yinyan, Wang Jue: guoqi gaige reng zai gongjian [Wang Jue 
says reform of SOEs is still storming fortifications], Zhongguo Jingji Shibao [China Economic Daily](Aug. 
27, 2003), available at http://www.szed.com/n/ca392383.htm.
6foreigners, in addition to other means.  In other words, socialist China is embracing 
capitalism through securities markets.
China’s stock market was initially launched as an effort to finance the countries 
ailing SOEs and to improve their performance through public listing.9  The Chinese 
population has been persuaded to commit a significant part of its savings to the securities 
market.10  However, like many other developing countries, China had implemented severe 
restrictions on foreign participation in its capital markets, not only in terms of foreign 
portfolio investment, but also in terms of securities-related services by foreign 
intermediaries.  Until very recently, the Chinese practice on regulating securities markets 
was very restrictive, not only by comparison to OECD countries which have advanced 
market economies but to its Asian non-OECD neighbors as well.11
It appears that the issue of foreign participation deserves a revisit in partly because 
China has accepted substantial commitments for trade in services upon its accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) to expand the scope of operations permitted to foreign 
firms and because China has taken measures to honor those commitments.  Recent efforts 
include the enactment of a variety of new rules allowing foreign firms to invest in the 
domestic shares market, which was exclusively reserved for Chinese citizens in the past, as 
well as to acquire and merge with domestic listed companies.   In some areas relating to 
capital markets and securities services, China bold liberalization measures exceed its 
obligations undertaken under the WTO.  The broader context of these efforts contains not 
9 See OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 497 (2003).
10 See id.
11 See id, at 525.
7merely WTO compliance, but also a sincere recognition of the fact that enlarged foreign 
participation can raise the general level of skills in the capital markets, as well as the 
determination of the Chinese leadership to accelerate privatization of China’s SOEs and to 
establish a market economy based on private enterprises.
Notwithstanding the recent liberalization measures, foreign institutions are still not 
able to invest without limit in China’s domestic equity markets.12  In the limited areas in 
which foreign involvement is allowed, foreign institutions are still effectively excluded 
from taking full advantage of their legal rights literally granted by Chinese laws and 
international legal instruments such as the WTO agreements, virtually because of various 
barriers arising out of the swaying regulatory culture, ambiguity of laws, and poor
corporate governance of many Chinese domestic listed companies.
The objective of this article is to describe and critically analyze the existing 
Chinese regulations on foreign participation in Chinese stock markets.  In addition, it also 
explores the prospect of further liberalization and regulatory reform of Chinese securities 
regulations.  Part I provides background information, introducing the basic features and the 
evolution of the Chinese securities regulatory framework insofar as foreign investment is 
concerned.  Part II presents a comprehensive description of the legal framework 
concerning foreign participation in both portfolio investment and intermediate services.  
Part III examines and critically analyzes the legal barriers and de facto restrictions on 
foreign participation in China’s stock market caused by the defects of the regulatory 
regime as well as the lack of good corporate governance practice in China’s listed 
12
 The OECD points out that in all OECD countries foreign firms are now allowed to invest without limits, 
although some countries make exceptions for certain “strategic” industries.  See id, at 526.
8companies.  In part IV, the article explores the prospects of further liberalization and 
perfection of the Chinese regulatory system.  The finding of this article is that, in order to 
achieve the ambition to make its stock market one of the most successful in the world and 
to meet its WTO obligations, China needs to substantially improve its regulatory and legal 
framework and adjust to different regulatory philosophies, including rethinking the role of 
foreign investors, redefining the role and functions of government with a view to providing 
institutions supporting market, and creating real good corporate governance for listed 
companies.  China will be able to establish a securities regulatory framework consistent 
with international practice.  This, however, depends on the success of reform agenda in 
some key areas relating to securities and corporate law.
I. BACKGROUND: A SPINDLING STOCK MARKET  
AND THE DUALIST REGULATORY REGIME 
A.  Evolution of the Chinese Stock Market and the Regulatory Regime
Before the early 1950s China was once the home to one of Asia’s largest stock 
markets.13  During the 1940s Shanghai Securities Exchange was the largest stock exchange 
13 According to a documentary book compiled by Mr. Liu Hongru, the first head of PRC’s regulatory 
authority on securities market in the reform era, the first stock market in China, called the Shanghai Stock 
Market [Shanghai Gufen Gongsuo], was created by foreign firms  in 1869. In 1918, Japan set up the 
Shanghai Securities Branch [Shanghai Quyin Suo] of the Osaka stock exchange. Stock of Chinese enterprises 
was first issued in 1872 by the Shanghai General Bureau of Shipbuilding and Commerce. Two years later, in 
1914, the Chinese government enacted laws to govern the Stock Exchange Market. Between 1918 and 1920, 
China established three large securities markets. The securities markets were interrupted for cause of 
Chinese-Japanese war broke out in 1930s and the World War II. In 1946 the Nationalist government set up 
the Shanghai Securities Exchange. See Zhongguo Zhengquan Shouce [China Securities Handbook] 513-16 
9in Asia and more influential and internationally supported than that of Hong Kong.14 In 
1949 when the Communist Party took over the country and established the PRC, it began 
to institute a centrally planned economy in mainland China and finally eliminated 
securities activities together with any other private ownership in 1959.15 As a result, for 
about 30 years from the 1950s to 1980s, there was no securities market at all in China.
Reintroduction of stock companies and stock market was considered in the 
“Reform and Opening Up” era initiated by China’s former paramount leader Deng 
Xiaoping, featuring a market-oriented reform agenda of the economic system.  
Restructuring the economy generated more and more capital needs, which could not be met 
by the traditional sources – collecting funds and taxes from State-owned enterprises.  In 
addition, fed up with the poor performance of SOEs, the Chinese leadership saw capital 
markets as an alternative to construct new types of corporate entities.
(Liu Hongru ed., 1992) (cited in Andrew Xuefeng Qian, Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing Enterprises and 
the Emerging of Securities Regulatory Regime in China, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 62, 64 & note 6-8 
(1993) ).
      There is, however, different historical finding as to the “first” stock exchange in China.  William N. Goetzmann, 
Andrey Ukhov and Ning Zhu of the Yale International Center for Finance (ICF) find that China’s first stock exchange, 
named Shanghai Share Broker’s Association, was found in 1891.  See William N. Goetzmann, China and the World 
Financial Markets 1870-1930: Modern Lessons from Historical Globalization, Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-62 
(2001), at p. 7, online PDF version of the paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=189139.
14 See Ann P. Vandevelde, Realizing the Re-Emergence of the Chinese Stock Market: Fact or Fiction?  30 
Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 579, 583 (1997).  It was noted that “Shanghai was then one of the most important 
capital markets in Asia, with a strong domestic and international banking sector and a vigorous market for 
domestic and foreign stocks and bonds.”
15 See Minkang Gu & Robert C. Art??Securitization of State Ownership: Chinese Securities Law, 18 Mich. J. 
Int'l L. 115, 117 (1996). 
10
The OECD, in its recent study of the development of China’s economy, correctly 
observes that the growth of the Chinese capital markets, in which the stock market has 
been an indispensable part from the outset, proceeded through three stages: (i) a formative 
period in the late 1970s to 1980s, (ii) the emergence of more formal structures including 
stock exchanges and a regulatory regime in the early 1990s, and (iii) additional reforms 
after the 1997 Asian crisis.16  The first stage was featured with informal markets in 
company stocks for which initiatives, including both issuing and trading, came from 
enterprises themselves or from local governments without the approval of the central 
authority in Beijing.17  Many collective firms issued debentures and internal employee 
shares.18  In 1984, China officially began experimenting with the idea of establishing joint 
stock companies, which started in Beijing where a departmental store was given 
permission to issue shares to its employees.19  The capital markets evolved more rapidly 
than the government anticipated, as firms sought new ways to raise capital and residents to 
invest.  Government regulation of the market activities therefore came only after the fact.  
At first, Beijing did not allow the bonds and stocks issued to be tradable.  However, 
secondary markets developed underground (which is called “black-market” by the Chinese) 
despite the lack of official approval.  Eventually the government acknowledged this 
16 See OECD, supra note 9, at 499.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See SALLY A. HARPOLE, CHINA BUSINESS LAW GUIDE, ¶38-310. (1993 CCH International), and 
see Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance: 
the Case of Chinese Stock Companies, the World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1794 (1997), at 
p. 6, available at http://www.worldbank.org.
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practice and endorsed it with formal sanctions.20 Two stock exchanges were established in 
the early 1990s, entering China’s stock market into the second stage.21 This stage, at its 
early time, was contaminated by stock market “fever” which broke out in Southeast China 
in 1992,22 ignited by Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour declaring that China would replace 
the planned economy with the market economy and encouraging people to boldly conduct
economic experiments in every aspect of the economy irrespective of the socialistic or 
capitalistic nature of economic activities.23 The fever was, however, short- lived.  The
institutions, nevertheless, were gradually established in this stage.  In the third stage, the 
20 See DANIEL A. LAPRES & ZHANG YUEJIAO, BUSINESS LAW IN CHINA (ICC Publication No. 
576), 338(1997). 
21
 The Shanghai Stock Exchange was opened in December 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in April 
1991.  In terms of utilizing of modern computer and telecommunication technology, the two exchanges are 
among the best in the world.
22 See OECD, supra note 9, at 499.
23
 Deng Xiaoping said in this tour, “We should be bolder than before in conducting reform and opening to the 
outside and have the courage to experiment.” In responding to someone’s fear of bold experiment would lead 
to capitalism, Deng Xiaoping said, “ The chief criterion for making a judgment is should be whether it 
promotes the growth of productive forces in a socialist society, increases the overall strength of the socialist 
state and raises living standards.” As to repealing of the planned economy, Deng Xiaoping said, “The 
proportion of planning to market forces is not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism.  A 
planned economy is not equivalent to socialism … a market economy is not capitalism, because there are 
markets under socialism too.”  As to securities markets, he said, “Are securities and the stock market good or 
bad?  …Are they peculiar to capitalism?  Can socialism make use of them? We allow people to reserve their 
judgment, but we must try these things out.”  See Excepts from Talks given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai 
and Shanghai (January 18-Feburary 21,1992), available at
http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/vol13/text/dl200.html (visited Nov. 10, 1999).
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central government’s attitude towards the capital markets changed significantly in the 
sense that “corporatization” was regarded as a major solution to the problems created by 
SOEs for which other mechanisms turned out to be futile.  In late 1996, the central 
government determined that transformation of SOEs through public issuance of equity 
shares as well as the stock market itself should be promoted as part of this industries
restructuring programme.24
The second and third stages were also featured with the construction of a formal 
legal and regulatory framework for the securities sectors.  China did not have a special 
central agency to regulate securities markets until the early 1990s.  At the very beginning, 
overlapping authorities regulating securities surprisingly co-existed for several years.  
Authorities such as People’s Bank of China, Ministry of Finance, the State Planning 
Commission, the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System, the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, and many local governments, etc., all had 
issued norms governing different or similar  activities in the securities markets.25
Confusions and conflicts thus created finally led to the creation of a centralized market 
regulatory body.  The formation of the State Council Securities Committee (the “SCSC”) 
and China Securities Regulatory Commission (the “CSRC”) in 1992 marked the first effort 
to establish unified regulatory control over the market.  The SCSC was charged with the 
primary authority for market regulation.  The CSRC was designed as the SCSC’s executive 
organ, responsible for conducting supervision and regulation of the market in accordance 
24 See OECD, supra note 9, at 499.
25 See ZHU SANZHU, SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN CHINA 8-13 (Transnational Publishers, 2000).
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with powers delegated by the SCSC.26 In April 1998, pursuant to the ambitious State 
Council Reform Plan launched by Premier Zhu Rongji, the SCSC was repealed and the 
CSRC became the sole ministry under the State Council charged with the duty to supervise 
the securities markets.  The so-called “centralized securities supervisory system” was only 
achieved at that time.
China has also promulgated a good body of securities laws.  Since 1987, various
authorities have released several hundreds of norms and regulations governing the issuance 
and transaction of securities.27  Among those laws the most important ones are the 1993 
enacted The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter the “Company
Law”), effective on January 1, 1994, and the 1998 Securities Law of the People’s Republic 
of China ( hereafter “the Securities Law”), effective on July 1, 1999.  The Company Law 
regulates the establishment, operation, internal management and dissolution of limited 
liability companies and stock companies.  In terms of securities regulations, it covers the 
rights and obligations of shareholders, powers and responsibilities of directors, financial 
and accounting requirements for companies, as well as corporate termination and 
liquidation.  The Securities Law is the primary regulation on market oversight and 
operation, governing registration and public issuance of shares, secondary market 
transactions, disclosure, insider trading, mergers and acquisitions, as well as the behavior 
of stock exchanges and securities firms.  Supplemental to that are numerous decrees issued 
by the CSRC and other authorities (such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, 
26 See CSRC, A Brief Introduction of China Securities Regulatory Commission, at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRCSite/eng/eabout/eintr.htm (visited 10 November 2003).
27 See Sun Jie: Zhejianhui Zhuxi Zhou Zhengqing Fangtan [Interview with CSRC Chairman Zhou Zhengqing], 
in Zhongguo Zhengquan Shibao [China Securities Daily], Dec.30, 1998, at page 1.
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etc.) concerning detailed rules or specialized areas of stock market activities.
B.  Special Features of China’s Stock Market
The Chinese stock market is unique among dozens of its peers in the world.  
Absent of the knowledge of the key characteristics of the market, it is entirely impossible 
to understand any aspect of the Chinese securities regulations, including those on foreign 
investment.  A recent report of Sheldon Gao, senior director of the Dow Jones Indexes, 
identified fourteen key features of China’s stock market using the Dow Jones Global Index 
and Dow Jones China Index as tools.28  Some of them, because of their strong relevance to 
the perfection of the regulatory regime, are worth noting and discussing here.
(1) Abnormal performance: Since the inceptions of the two stock exchanges in the 
early 1990s, the Chinese stock market has delivered impressive returns in most of the years 
so far.  The Dow Jones Report showed that, during the eight-year period from 1994 
through 2001, as measured by the Dow Jones China Index consisting of 549 stocks as of 
31 January 2002, China’s stock market outpaced many of the world’s leading indexes, 
including the Dow Jones STOXX 600 on European markets, Hong Kong’s Hang Seng 
Index, Japan’s Nikkei 225, as well as the Dow Jones World Emerging Markets Index 
covering eleven emerging markets around the world.29  The performance, however, could 
only be characterized as “abnormal” because it is not based on the performance of the 
listed companies and the Chinese economy as well.30
28 China Stock Market in Global Perspective, Dow Jones Indexes, September 2003 (Research report by 
Sheldon Gao, senior director, Dow Jones Indexes) (Hereinafter the Dow Jones Report).
29 See the Dow Jones Report, supra note 28, at 6.
30 See id.  A vivid evidence is that since 2001, the Chinese stock market has been grim despite that China’s 
economy has been experiencing explosive GDP growth.
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(2) Insulated market: As this article will discuss in the following part, China’s 
stock market divides its shares into a variety of types.31  “Class A shares” are restricted to 
domestic investors.  Foreign investors originally were only allowed to buy and trade (with 
restrictions) the so-called “B shares.”  Only recently, a small number of investors in the 
two markets have been allowed to participate in both markets.32  It is alleged that market 
segregation plus the foreign exchange control regime helped China to protect its economy 
against foreign harassment during the Asian financial crisis of 1997.33  However, in recent 
years, the segregation is increasingly viewed as a barrier between China’s capital markets 
and international investors.
(3) Substantial government ownership and low float ratio:  Free float ratio, 
representing a stock market’s liquidity and investability, refers to the proportion of freely 
tradable shares available to investors.34  Due to widespread state ownership, the float ratio 
in China’s stock market, close to 30 percent since 1993, appears to be extremely slow.35
Although things have been changing due to recent regulatory relaxations allowing foreign 
investors to have greater participation in SOEs,36  in most listed companies which were 
converted from SOEs, only one-third of the company’s shares are typically issued to the 
public, with the rest remaining in the hands of the government, the company itself, or other 
31 See infra, part I(C)(1) of this article.
32 See id.
33 See The Dow Jones Report, supra note 28, at 12.
34 See id, at 14.
35
 One can appreciate the extremity of China’s stock market in float ratio by contrasting it with that of other 
markets: the ratio in the U.S. is 93.9%, in Europe 78.7%, and in Japan 79.6%.  See id, at 14-15.
36 See infra, part II of this article.
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state-owned companies.37  According to a Dow Jones survey, the average government 
ownership in China’s stock market was 45 percent, as of 31 January 2002, with a 
maximum of 89 percent.  Such a high percentage of state ownership does not exist in any 
other stock market in the world.38
(4)  Irregular expansion primarily through IPOs: The size of a stock market 
expands through either external expansion, which refers to the issuance of new shares such 
as IPOs, secondary offerings and follow-up offerings, or internal growth, which is the 
appreciation of existing shares.39  While in most other places in the world stock markets 
expand through internal growth,40 in China the opposite has been true.  Since the early 
1990s, the total market value grew at an annual rate of 47.4 percent, only 16.9 percent was 
contributed by an increase in the value of the existing stocks.41  In other words, almost 
two- thirds of the market growth was the result of external expansion.  The significance is 
that the return on existing stocks is substantially weakened despite the amazing expansion 
of market size. 
(5)  Typical characteristics of emerging market embodied by confused and
restrictive regulations:  Due to lack of regulatory experience, rule of law, and of fully 
developed market economy, China’s stock market possesses many of the features that are 
characteristics of emerging markets.  First, there are too many types of shares to confuse 
37 See The Dow Jones Report, supra note 28, at 15.
38 See id, at 16.
39 See id, at 17.
40
 For instance, during the years from 1993 to 2001, 84% of the market growth was the result of internal 
growth while only 16% came from new issuance of stocks in the U.S. stock market.  See id, at 18.
41 See id.
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investors.  In addition to the well-known “A shares” and “B shares”, there are several 
additional classes available to global investors and denominated in free exchangeable 
currencies, such as the H, N, L, and S shares listed in Hong Kong, New York, London and 
Singapore, respectively.42  Secondly, initial public offerings (IPOs) are strictly regulated in 
China.  China is identified by the Dow Jones report as “the only country in which the 
government completely controls the size of the stock market, the pace of issue and the 
allocation of resources.”43 Thirdly, the market is predominated by small-cap stocks rather 
than blue-chip companies, in both absolute size and in relation to the rest of the world, due 
to the fact that most of China’s blue-chips are listed only on overseas exchanges and are 
not available to domestic investors.44  Fourthly, the market is dominated by retail 
investors.45  Institutional investors are underdeveloped in China’s stock market.  Finally, 
contrary to the global trend of consolidating multi exchanges of a single jurisdiction into a 
single-exchange structure, China has two stock exchanges of similar size, performing 
virtually the same functions on every aspect.46
(6)  Pyramid structure and unusual “core”:  A matured stock market is supported 
by a group of blue-chip companies that acts as the “core” or backbone of the market 
structure.47  Such a market “is generally shaped like a top-heavy gyroscope or funnel – a 
few of these blue-chip companies may easily represent a huge chunk of the market or 
42 See id, at 21.
43 See id, at 22.
44 See id, at 22.
45 See id, at 22.
46 See id, at 23.
47 See id, at 24.
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dominate the benchmark index’s movement.”48 The numerous small- cap companies, at the 
bottom of the market structure, are relatively insignificant.  But in China, the stock market 
lacks real blue-chip stocks with high profitability and, as such, investors are overwhelmed 
with small-caps.49
(7)  Incredible speculation:  In a developed stock market, because investors have 
more confidence in the long-term economic prospects and the steady growth of corporate 
profits, the turnover level, which represents the frequency of trading or the length of 
holding period, is generally lower.50  Data demonstrates that the average turnover in 
China’s stock market was 500 percent, indicating that an individual stock changed hands 
five times a year on average.51  The average holding period is two months.  By contrast, in 
a mature market, the normal holding period for a stock is about two years.52  This suggests 
that the spirit of speculation is extremely strong and widespread.  As the Dow Jones report 
observes, “The fundamental truth is that the investing environment of China’s stock market 
simply does not encourage long-term investment strategies.”53
(8)  Disappointing earnings of companies and low dividend yield:  The 
phenomenon of incredible speculation could be explained by the lack of “core” blue-chip 
48 See id, at 24-25.
49
 For instance, the Dow Jones report identified only one company listed in China as a large stock – Shenzhen 
Development Bank, and 130 companies as mid-cap stocks.  The remaining over 1,000 companies are 
classified as small-cap or micro-cap companies.  See id, at 22.
50 See id, at 36.
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 See id, at 37.
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companies in the market as well as by the poor performance of listed companies in terms 
of making profits and distributing dividends.  The fact that most companies posted low 
earnings, despite the abnormal performance of the market, leads to the recognition of the 
size of the bubble in China’s stock market.54  At least, it is indisputable that most stocks 
are seriously overvalued.55  Cash dividend distribution, which plays a crucial role in long-
term investment, appears not to be so important in the Chinese stock market, albeit the law 
requires that no company could make a follow-up or secondary offering unless it pays a 
cash dividend (which helps the market’s payout percentage to stay within a reasonable 
range).  However, China’s dividend yield (0.75 percent only) is terribly low in comparison 
with the rest of the world as well as with other investment vehicles in China including the 
CD rate and bond rate.56  To be sure, the low payout percentage and dividend yield are 
rooted in the poor earnings of listed companies.57
In brief, as demonstrated by the above discussions, the current plight of the Chinese 
stock market is marked by a number of structural flaws, of which the most important ones 
are the pyramid structure58 and confusions in regulatory policies.  These special features 
certainly have a tremendous impact on foreign participation in China’s stock market.
C.  Opening Up of China’s Stock Market and the Dualist Regulatory Regime
As noted previously, the original goal of the Chinese government for developing 
securities markets was two-fold: (1) to mobilize private saving in order to finance SOEs, 
54 See id, at 40.
55 See id.
56 See id, at 45.
57 See id, at 46.
58 See id, at 47.
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and (2) to improve SOE performance through public participation.59 Seemingly, foreign 
participation was not conceived as needed at the outset of the development of China’s 
stock market.  Desires for international participation, which came from both Chinese 
domestic enterprises in certain sectors that were in dire need of both foreign investment 
and the legal status as listed companies and foreign investors who wished to participate in 
China’s capital markets, pressed the government to create a room for foreign participation 
in the stock market in the early 1990s.  The opening up of the Chinese stock market started 
with creating a domestic B shares market that until very recently was only available to 
foreigners, followed by the construction of a parallel regulatory framework for foreign 
portfolio investment, mergers and acquisitions with foreign companies, and market access 
to foreign intermediaries business.
1.  Chinese Classification of Stocks – All Shares Are Not Created Equal
Though both the Company Law and the Securities Law are curiously silent on the 
classification of corporate stocks, it remains the most distinctive feature of Chinese 
securities markets: the stock, in addition to its universal classification as common stock, 
preferred stock, etc, is also defined by the status and nationality of the shareholders.60
59 See OECD, supra note 9, at 497.
60
 In a developed capitalist market the idea is that “all shares are equal”. Nevertheless, there are also different 
types of stocks which are, most commonly, common and preferred shares.  The distinction between this two 
classes arises as a result of the investors’ dividend expectations, voting rights and priority in liquidation.  
Apart from these differences, shareholders of each class of shares are entitled to equal rights and equal 
benefits, irrespective of their origin and citizenship.  See William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: 
The Inherent Conflict between China’s Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market, 27 Brook. J. 
Int’l L. 477, 495 (2002).
21
There are four classes of shares in China’s stock market, which include state shares, legal 
person shares, A shares tradable by domestic individuals, and foreign capital shares (B 
shares).  The basic rationale under the class distinction is chiefly ideology-based, for the 
primary purpose of controlling the transferability of different types of shares and 
maintaining the leading role of government in the economy.
(1) State Shares (Guojia gu):  State shares refers to shares held by central
governmental agencies, local governments, or authorized institutions on behalf of the State.  
According to relevant regulations, it shall include: (i) the shares converted from the net 
assets of SOEs which have been transformed into stock companies, (ii) shares initially 
issued by various companies and purchased by the central or local governmental 
departments investing on behalf of the State, and (3) shares initially issued by companies 
and purchased by the investment companies, assets management companies, and economic 
entities authorized to make investments on behalf of the State.61 State shares are not 
allowed for trading on open markets such as a stock exchange or an OTC market.
Nevertheless, they can be transferred upon approval of the CSRC and the State Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Sales of state shares to foreign 
investors have been allowed recently as a result of a post-WTO reform programme.62
(2)  Legal Person Shares (Faren gu): Referring to shares of a stock company 
owned by another company or organization with a “legal person” status,63 the legal person 
61
 FANG Liu Fang, China’s Corporation Experiment, 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L.149, 203 (1995). 
62 See infra, part II (C) of this article.
63
 Like many other civilian jurisdictions, legal persons, under the Chinese law, are collective organizations 
considered by the law as having a legal personality distinct from the natural individuals who make them up. 
They are subject to the law with the attribution of legal capacity and may possess both rights and duties. 
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shares can be indirectly held by the State if the shareholders are State-owned companies.64
Basically, this class includes shares held by domestic entities in which the state is the 
majority owner but has not the entire ownership.65  There are four types of ownership for 
legal person shares, namely, state-owned legal person shares, collective enterprise legal 
person shares, private enterprise legal person shares, foreign invested enterprise legal 
person shares, and institutional legal person shares. 66 Trading of legal person shares 
through stock exchanges is prohibited, albeit this can be done upon case-by- case approval 
from relevant authorities.  Like state shares, legal person shares can be sold to foreigners 
according to several laws issued after China’s accession to the WTO.67
(3) A Shares or individual shares (Geren gu): Individual shares, with an official 
recognized nickname of “A shares”, refer to shares that may only be owned by Chinese 
residents (including domestic institutions).  A shares have the full function born by classic 
stock, and can be freely traded and transferred in domestic markets.  For a long time until 
very recently, these shares were the only type of equity that were traded among domestic 
investors at the two stock exchanges and were not accessible to foreign investors.68
(4) B Shares or Foreign Capital Shares (Waizi gu):  Foreign capital shares include 
B shares and overseas listing shares.  B shares are shares which were originally offered 
Companies, public or private entities or public bodies can become legal persons through appropriate 
registration under the law.
64 See FANG, supra note 61, at 204. 
65 See Xu & Wang, supra note 19, at . 7.  See also OECD, supra note 9, at 512.
66 See FANG, supra note 61, at 204.
67 See infra, part II(C) of this article.
68 See infra, part II (A) of this article.
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exclusively to international investors.  Like other shares, they are denominated in RMB, 
but Chinese citizens until 2001 were not permitted to own or trade in B Shares.69
(5) Overseas listing shares: Overseas listing shares are shares issued by Chinese 
companies listed on securities markets outside mainland China.  Though subject to CSRC
regulations insofar as initial approval is needed for the companies to go abroad, they are 
not part of the Chinese securities market but rather components of the stock markets in 
which they are listed and traded.  They currently include H shares, N shares, L shares and 
S shares.  H shares are offered by Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange.  They are subscribed for and traded in Hong Kong Dollars, and denominated in 
RMB.  They can only be purchased and traded by Hong Kong local investors or 
international investors.70 N shares are issued to foreign investors on US stock exchanges.  
Some of them are issued through IPOs but many others are denominated in RMB and 
subscribed for in US dollar.  Dividends are declared in RMB but paid in US dollars.  As 
such, many N shares are not traded directly on stock exchanges but were issued by way of 
ADRs (American Depository Receipts). 71 L shares are issued on the London Stock 
Exchange according a memorandum of understanding signed between U.K and China’s 
relevant authorities on October 7, 1996.72  S shares are offered on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange.
A typical domestically listed Chinese company normally has a mixed ownership 
structure, in which each of the three major groups (state, legal persons, and individuals) 
69 See infra note 89 and the accompanying text.
70 See I. A. TOKLEY & TINA RAVN, COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW IN CHINA 71 (1998). 
71 Id, at 72.
72 Id.
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holds about one third of total outstanding shares.73  The structure becomes more complex 
as many companies now also issue B shares to foreigners and Chinese residents.  Normally 
those overseas listed Chinese companies have not yet entered into the stock market of their 
home country.  In any case, only one-third of the shares in state-owned companies are 
tradable according to law.
2.  The Dualist Regulatory System
Insulated markets, class distinctions of shares and different treatment of ownership
naturally lead to different sets of regulations on foreign and domestic investors.  Since the 
creation of B shares, China has promulgated numerous statutes for the separate regulation 
of foreign participation in the capital markets, while domestic investors and institutions are 
subject to another set of laws.  Laws solely governing foreign investment will be discussed 
in the following parts of this article in detail.
It is not entirely clear whether foreign investment is also subject to the various laws 
supposed to be promulgated for domestic companies and transactions.  In essence, the 
Securities Law applies to the issuing and trading of shares, corporate bonds and other 
securities “as lawfully recognized by the State Council within China.”74  Conceivably, the 
law governs foreign investment-related securities such as B shares since they are “lawfully 
recognized” by the central government.  However, it has also to be made clear that 
“specific measures in respect of shares of companies in China which are to be subscribed 
and traded in foreign currencies by persons and institutions outside China shall be 
73 See Xu & Wang, supra note 19, at 8.
74
 Securities Law, art. 2.  
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separately formulated by the State Council.” 75  The implication is not that shares of 
Chinese companies reserved for foreign investment (B shares) and overseas listing shares
(H shares or N shares) are to be governed entirely by a separate set of regulations made by 
the State Council.  Instead, regulations on foreign investment are regarded as “specific”, 
“special”, or even “exceptional” measures on foreign participation, supplemental to the 
major laws on securities as an entirety.  For instance, the specific law on B shares 
promulgated by the State Council in 1995 states clearly that the rules of the law “are 
formulated in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Company Law of the People’s 
Republic of China,”76 implicating that it is still within, rather than separate from, the 
framework of the Company Law.  Another example is the rules concerning mergers and 
acquisitions.  In 2002 and 2003, China has promulgated a variety of laws regulating 
merger and acquisition, with a special emphasis on takeovers of Chinese companies by 
foreign investors.  Of the five major laws promulgated by various ministries, four are 
concerned with foreign takeovers and the other two contain rules regarding takeovers and 
disclosure in general, without making specific reference to purely domestic or foreign-
related transactions.  However, one provision of a leading law on foreign takeover 
stipulates that “transferring state shares and legal person shares to foreign investors shall 
75
 Id, art. 213.
76 See Guowuyuan guanyu gufen youxian gongsi jingnei shangshi waizi gu de guiding [Regulations of the 
State Council on Domestically Listed Foreign Capital Shares of Stock Companies], adopted at the 37th
Executive Meeting of the State Council on Nov. 2, 1995 and promulgated by Decree No. 189 of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China on December 25, 1995 (hereinafter the B Shares Regulations), 
art.1.
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also comply with relevant CSRC rules on takeovers, disclosure, etc.”,77 thus indicating that 
foreign-related transactions are subject to those general laws.
To summarize, although it is not explicitly established in the relevant laws, the 
dualist nature of the Chinese securities regulatory framework shall be understood as such, 
namely that regulations on foreign investment in China’s stock market serve as “special” 
laws to the general framework, whose provisions shall take precedent to relevant 
provisions of general laws in cases in which there is overlapping or conflict.  For matters 
not stipulated in foreign investment-specific laws, the provisions of general laws (such as 
the Securities Law or the Takeover Measures78) shall be followed.
II. CURRENT REGULATIONS ON FOREIGN 
PARTICIPATION IN CHINA’S STOCK MARKET
As noted previously, China’s equity markets are connected to the international
markets through a variety of channels.  Originally it was the B shares market accessible to 
global investors.  In recent years, as a result of China’s WTO commitments and 
compliance efforts, foreigners have gained larger room in the capital markets as well as in 
the securities services business.  Recent movements include the allowance of foreign 
institutional investors to buy and trade in A shares, more flexibility for takeovers of 
Chinese companies by foreigners, as well as greater market access for foreign securities 
business.79
77 See the Foreign Acquisition Rules, infra note 118, art. 4.
78 See the Takeover Measures, infra note 115.
79
 Until very recently (Mid-2002), there had been severe limitations on foreign participation of any kind in 
the Chinese capital markets.  See OECD, supra note 9, at 525-526.
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A.  The B Shares Market
Coming into existence in 1991,80 the B shares market perfectly reflected the 
Chinese leadership’s mixed feeling regarding the internationalization of securities markets, 
namely, making use of foreign capital without shaking socialist public ownership.  B 
shares are governed by mainly two regulations promulgated by the State Council and the 
CSRC, respectively.  One is The Regulations of the State Council on Domestically Listed 
Foreign Capital Shares of Stock Companies (hereinafter “the B Shares Regulations”)81, 
and the other is the Implementing Rules of the Regulations of the State Council on 
Domestically Listed Foreign Capital Shares of Stock Companies (hereinafter “B Shares 
Implementing Rules”).82 Pursuant to the two laws, B shares present the following features
(as opposed to A shares which are similar in terms of functions to common stocks in a 
Western stock company).
First, B shares are denominated in Chinese currency (Renminbi), but are subscribed 
for, bought and sold in foreign currency, and listed and traded on securities exchanges in 
China. 83 Dividends and other payments by the issuing company shall be calculated and 
80 See ZHU, supra note 25, at 127.  At the inception they were officially referred to as “Renminbi tezhong 
gupiao”[Renminbi special shares], nicknamed as “B shares.” See id.  With the enactment of the 1995 B 
Shares Regulations, both “B shares” and “jingnei shangshi waizi gu” [“domestically listed foreign capital 
shares”] were used in official documents.
81
 Title in Chinese Pinxin see supra note 76.
82
 Title in Chinese Pinxiin: Gufen youxian gongsi jingnei shangshi waizi gu de guiding de shishi xize.
83
 The B Shares Regulations, art. 2. 
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declared in Renminbi but paid in foreign currency.84 Second, B shares could only be 
issued to overseas investors, which, according to the Chinese definition, shall include 
foreigners, natural and legal persons from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and Chinese 
citizens that are residing abroad.85 Chinese in the mainland of China were not allowed to 
buy and trade in B shares.  Third, dividends and capital gains from B shares can be sent 
abroad freely despite China’s strict foreign exchange control.86 Fourth, foreign securities 
firm can serve as dealers of B shares while they were not allowed to do the business of A 
shares. The two stock exchanges could enact rules to stipulate the requirements for foreign 
securities firms to enter into agency agreements with Chinese partners or to act as dealers 
in trading B shares.87 The first foreign securities firm invading China’s securities markets 
was Morgan Stanley & Company, which established a joint venture entitled China 
International Capital Corporation with China Construction Bank and several other partners 
in 1995.88
Until early 2001, the B shares market was off-limits to individual and institutional 
Chinese investors.  This policy was changed then by a new government decree released on 
21 February 2001 which allows domestic individual investors to buy and trade B shares.89
84 Id, art. 25. Accordingly, a foreign exchange rate should be stated in the prospectus of the issuing company, 
or decided by a resolution of shareholders’ meeting.  See the B Shares Implementing Rules, art. 41.  
85
 The B Shares Regulations, art. 4. 
86 Id, art. 5
87
 B Shares Implementing Rules, art. 33.  
88 See Dave Lindorff, In Beijing, the Long March is just Starting, Bus. Wk., Feb. 12, 1996, at 68. 
89 See Zhongguo zhengquan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui, guojia waihui guanli ju, guanyu jingnei jumin geren 
touzi jingnei shangshi waizi gu ruogan wenti de tongzhi [Circular of the China Securities Regulatory 
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Nevertheless, B shares are still only subscribed in foreign currency and, as such, Chinese 
investors have to use the foreign exchange reserve in their banking accounts to buy those 
shares.90
The original purpose for the creation of the B shares market was to open “two 
windows” for the Chinese capital markets.  One window was designed as a channel to help 
a small number of Chinese SOEs obtain scarce foreign currency, and the other was 
expected to demonstrate to foreigners China’s resolve to open up its economy.91 Despite 
the poor performance of the B shares market, Chinese regulators have used many measures 
to boost the market, of which the most recent one was to channel the foreign currencies 
holdings of private citizens into the market.  This move, unexpectedly, destructed the 
original purpose underpinning the B shares regime.  In fact, the B shares market has been 
significantly marginalized: in the three years following the end of 2001, no single company 
was approved to issue B stock in the market.92  More telling is the size of the market.  
Commission and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Questions Regarding Investment in the B 
Shares Market by Chinese Residents], CSRC Decree No. 22 (2001) (hereinafter the B Shares Circular on 
Chinese Investors).  
90 See id, art. 2.
91 See CHAO Kejian et.al, Huifu rongzi gongneng, zhengxing B gu shichang [Restore the Financing 
Functions of and Boost the B Shares Market], in Shanghai Zhengquan Bao [Shanghai Securities Daily] 
(October 31, 2003), available at http://business.sohu.com/77/72/article215027277.shtml.
92
 In November 2003, Shanggong Stock Company obtained the approval of the CSRC to issue B shares to 14 
foreign institutions.  This was the first approval of issuance since the end of 2001.  See, shanggong gufen 
youxian gongsi faxing jingnei shangshi waizi gu (B gu) zhaogu shuoming shu zhaiyao [Prospect of 
Shanggong Stock Company for the Issuance of B Shares], Nov. 5, 2003, in Shanghai Zhengquan Bao 
(Shanghai Securities Daily), available at http://www.stocknews.com.cn.  See also ZHU Jinfu, Shanggong B 
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Despite many years of development, the B shares market remains small in terms of both 
the number of listed companies and market capitalization.93  The listed companies were 
also regarded as too small and too risky.
In light of the fact that the A shares market is being opened to foreign investors 
(albeit under limitations)94 and many Chinese companies now go directly abroad to raise 
foreign capital, the logic of having a separate B shares market would be called into 
question. Future priorities for development of China’s capital market should include 
merging the A shares and B Shares and eliminating the class distinctions among different 
types of stock.
B.  Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII)
It is said that Asian countries’ liberalization of capital markets normally has gone 
through three or four stages, including mainly initial permission of limited entry of foreign 
capital into the market, then opening the domestic markets to foreign institutional investors, 
and finally the overall liberalization of capital markets.95 Chinese regulators seemed 
suddenly to spot this experience shortly after the nation joined the WTO.
The experience mainly came from Taiwan.  Since 1990, in efforts to liberalize its 
gu qiaokai rongzi zhi men, B gu shichang mianlian chongxin dingwei [Shanggong B Shares Opened the 
Doors for Financing; B Shares Market Needs Reposition Itself], in Zhongguo Jingying Bao [China Business 
Operation Daily] (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/k/20030930/0935462053.shtml.
93 See CSRC database on B shares market at http://www.csrc.gov.cn.
94 See infra part II of this article.
95 See, Cao Fengqi Tan Dalu Ziben Shichang Touzi Guoji Hua Zhanlue Yu Duice [Cao Fengqi on strategies 
for the globalization of China’s Capital Market], statement by Prof. Cao Fengqi in the 2003 Advanced Forum 
on the Globalization of China’s Capital Market (October 11, 2003), available at http://news.sohu.com.
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stock market for access to foreigners, Taiwan has begun to permit qualified foreign 
institutional investors (QFIIs) to directly buy and trade in Taiwan-listed securities.96
Under the QFII regime, foreign banks, insurance companies and fund management 
institutions were allowed to invest directly in securities listed in the Taiwan Securities 
Exchange (TSE).  QFIIs must meet certain threshold requirements, including longevity, 
experience and asset.97  There were also strict requirements as to inward remittance of 
foreign capital, profit repatriation, and percentage limits on QFIIs’ investment in target 
companies.98
In November 2002, roughly one year before Taiwan abolished the QFII regime,99
the CSRC and People’s Bank of China (PBC), the two regulators on China’s financial 
markets, jointly introduced the mainland’s QFII system in a decree titled Provisional Rules 
on Administration of Domestic Securities Investment of Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors (QFII) (hereinafter the QFII Rules).100 Effective December 1, 2002, foreign 
financial institutions could apply to invest directly in China’s domestic A shares market. 
The two stock exchanges both released their “Implementing Rules” regarding the 
96 See Jeffrey H. Chen & Jack J. T. Huang, Taiwan’s Evolving Stock Market: Policy and Regulatory Trends, 
12 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. 34, 40-41 (1993).
97 Id.
98 Id, at 42-44.
99
 Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance formally abandoned the QFII system on October 2, 2003.  See, Taiwan 
Abandons QFII System, available at http://www.china-
ready.com/news/Oct03/TaiwanAbandonsQFIISystem100303.html (visited Nov. 17, 2003).
100 See Hege jingwai jigou touzizhe jingnei zhengquan touzi guanli zanxing banfa [Provisional Rules on 
Administration of Domestic Securities Investment of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII)], Joint 
Decree No. 12 of the CSRC and PBC, Nov. 5, 2003.
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application of QFII Rules in the effective date of December 1, 2002.101
The QFII Rules define “QFIIs” as “overseas asset management institutions, 
insurance companies, securities companies, and other asset management institutions” 
approved by the CSRC and granted foreign exchange quota for the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE).102  Curiously enough, foreign banks are not included in the
definition, although commercial banks are mentioned in an article of the Rules concerning 
asset size.  In addition, it is widely understood that banks can operate in China’s QFII 
system through their asset management subsidiaries.
Compared with the Taiwan QFII system, the threshold access standard for foreign 
institutions is rather high in terms of their experience, asset requirements, and business 
longevity.  To be qualified as QFII in China, a fund management company must have 
conducted fund management business for at least five years, managing asset size no less 
than US$ 10 billion in the past year; an insurance company shall have conducted insurance 
business for over 30 years, with actual paid-up capital of no less than US$ 1 billion and 
securities assets managed in the latest fiscal year of no less than US$ 10 billion; a 
securities firm shall have conducted securities business for over 30 years, with actual paid-
up capital of no less than US$ 1 billion and securities assets managed in the latest fiscal 
year of no less than US$ 10 billion, and a commercial bank shall have its total assets 
ranked among the top 100 in the world in the latest fiscal year and securities assets 
101
 Texts of the implementing rules passed by the two stock exchanges can be found at their website at 
http://www.sse.com.cn (Shanghai) and http://www.sse.org.cn (Shenzhen).
102 See the QFII Rules, supra note 100, art. 2.
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managed of no less than US$ 10 billion.103 In addition, the applicants for QFII shall have 
sound corporate governance structure and internal control system, and their home 
jurisdiction shall have signed Memorandum of Understanding with the CSRC for cross-
border regulatory cooperation.104
A QFII can invest in A shares (but not B shares), listed government bonds, 
convertible bonds, corporate bonds, and other financial instruments as approved by the 
CSRC.105 However, any investment amount must not exceed the quota granted by the 
SAFE.106  In addition, Shares held by each QFII in one listed company should not exceed 
ten percent of total outstanding shares of the company, and total shares held by all QFIIs in 
one listed company should not exceed twenty percent of total outstanding shares of the 
company.107  QFIIs are also required to comply with the “Guidelines to Foreign 
103 See the QFII Rules, art. 7.  In contrast, when Taiwan implemented the QFII regime in 1991, it only 
required that, in order to be approved for QFII, a commercial bank should have total assets among the top 
500 in the world, with securities asset managed in the size no less than US$ 300 million; an insurance 
company should have conducted insurance business for over 10 years, managing securities assets in the size 
no less than US$ 500 million; and a fund management company should have been in the business for five 
years with the size of managed asset no less than US$ 500 million.  See, Tai Zhengquan Zhuanjia: Neidi 
QFII Menkan Yuan Gaoyu Taiwan Shuiping [Taiwan securities experts: Mainland’s QFII threshold is far 
high than that of Taiwan], in Nanfang Ribao [Nanfang Daily] (December 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/243938.htm.  
104 See QFII Rules, art. 6 (3) and art. 6(4).
105 Id, art. 18.
106 Id.
107 Id, art. 20.
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Investment” issued by the State Council once a year.108
Like the Taiwanese system, one of the most prominent features of the mainland 
QFII is the strict control of inflow and outflow of capital.  Each QFII may only apply to 
remit an amount within the quota assigned by the SAFE, which ranges from US$ 50 
million to 800 million.109  However, it is not clear how many times a QFII can apply each 
year.110  For capital outflow, the Rules stipulate that the principal investment shall stay in 
108
 According to the current Guidelines for Foreign Investment, foreign investment projects are divided into 
four categories: encouraged, permitted, restricted, and prohibited.  Foreign investment is not allowed 
(prohibited) in projects jeopardizing national security, polluting the environment and harming human health, 
occupying large tracks of land, retarding military facilities, and employing technologies peculiar to China.  It 
is restricted in areas that use backward technologies, that are detrimental to the ecological environment, that 
involve exploration of protected minerals, and that belong to industries that the state only allows gradual 
openness.  All the other areas are either encouraged or permitted.  See zhidao waishang touzi fangxiao 
guiding [Guidelines for Foreign Investment], promulgated by the State Council on Feb. 11, 2002 and 
effective April 1, 2002.  The Guidelines are state regulations, following which, the state ministries concern 
jointly issue a Foreign Investment Catalogue to implement the Guidelines.  The current effective Catalogue 
was released on March 2002.
109 See Hege jingwai jigou touzizhe jingnei zhengquan touzi waihui guanli zanxing guiding [Provisional 
Rules on the Administration of Foreign Exchange Issues for QFII], released by the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange of China on Nov.29, 2002, art. 8 (hereinafter QFII Rules on Foreign Exchange).
110
 As of this writing, UBS Warburg, the first approved QFII in China, has used up its first approved quota of 
US$ 500 million and is applying for a second quota for US$ 300 million.  The two applications were 
certainly submitted within a year.  HSBC has also applied to increase its quota. See,Haiwai touzizhe kanhao 
A gu shichang, QFII fen shenqing zengjia e’du [Overseas investor optimistic at the A shares market: QFIIs 
are rushing to apply for increase in quota amount], in Zhengquan Ribao [Securities Daily](Nov. 4, 2003), 
available at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/FI-c/435182.htm.
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China for three years until it is allowed to repatriate only by installments.111  Restrictive as 
it is, this provision effectively forces the investors to stay in the market, irrespective of 
their market judgment.  The rationale is, obviously, to limit the detrimental effect of 
international “hot money” which was alleged to cause the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
C. Takeover by Foreign Companies (Mergers and Acquisitions)
Permission of foreign access to the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) market is 
regarded as the boldest movement of the Chinese government in opening up its capital 
markets and restructuring the SOEs.  Out of the concern for sovereign control over the 
national economy, China’s government had been very hostile toward foreign takeover of 
Chinese companies, be it hostile or friendly mergers or acquisitions.  The two earliest 
foreign takeovers of PRC companies occurred in May 1995.  One involves the acquisition 
of 25 percent of the shares of Beilu Co. by two Japanese companies, and the other was the 
purchase of 20 percent of the shares of Jiangling Automobile Company by Ford Motor 
Company.112  The two takeovers triggered tremendous volatility in China’s stock market 
and attracted the attention of Chinese regulators immediately.  One month later, the 
Chinese authority issued a “notice” mandating that “no unit shall be allowed to transfer 
state shares and legal person shares to foreign investors until the state promulgated laws 
allowing this”, although the two takeovers that had already taken place were 
111 See QFII Rules, art. 26.
112 See, Binggou hui jizhong zai naxie hangye? [On what areas will foreign mergers and acquisitions focus?], 
in Beijing Chenbao [Beijing Morning News](Nov. 5, 2002), available at 
http://202.84.17.28/csnews/20021105/295748.asp. 
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grandfathered.113
WTO accession – and the anticipation of it – has led to dramatic changes in 
Chinese regulators’ attitude towards foreign invasion into the Chinese economy through 
M&As.  On the contrary, as this article will discuss later on, they might now view that as 
an effective way to reform China’s struggling SOEs.  Since 2001, a number of regulations 
and rules have been released to liberalize takeovers by foreign investors of Chinese 
companies, including, mainly, SOEs.  The laws include:
Several Opinions concerning Foreign Investment in Listed Companies,114 issued by 
the CSRC and Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (the predecessor of 
Ministry of Commerce), November 2001 (hereinafter Several Opinions);
Administrative Measures on the Takeovers of Listed Companies,115 issued by the 
CSRC, September 2002 (hereinafter Takeover Measures);
Circular on the Transfer of State Shares and Legal Person Shares to Foreign 
Investors,116 issued by the CSRC, Ministry of Finance, and State Commission on Economy 
and Trade, November 2002 (hereafter the State Shares Circular);
113 See Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu zhuanfa guowuyuan zhengquan weiyuanhui guanyu zanting jiang 
shangshi gongsi guojiagu he farengu zhuanrang gei waishang qingshi de tongzhi [Notice of the State Council 
on the Transmission of the Request of the State Council Securities Commission Asking for Suspending the 
Transfer of State Shares and Legal Person Shares to Foreign Investors], September 23, 1995, art. 1.
114
 Title in Chinese pinxin: Guanyu shangshi gongsi sheji waishang touzi youguan wenti de ruogan yijian.
115
 Title in Chinese pinxin: Shangshi gongsi shougou guanli banfa.
116
 Title in Chinese pinxin: Guanyu xiang waishang zhuanrang shangshi gongsi guoyougu he farengu 
youguan wenti de tongzhi.
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Provisional Rules on Restructuring SOEs by Utilizing Foreign Investment,117
issued by Ministry of Finance, State Administration on Foreign Exchange, State Industrial 
Administration, and State Commission on Economy and Trade, November 2002 
(hereinafter SOE Restructuring Rules);
Provisional Rules on the Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors,118 issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the State 
General Administration of Taxation, the State General Administration of Industry and 
Commerce, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, March 2003 (hereinafter
Foreign Acquisition Rules), and
Administrative Measures on the Disclosure of Change in Share Holding of
Shareholders,119 issued by the CSRC, September 2002 (hereinafter the Disclosure 
Measures).
The above laws, together with a number of other decrees and rules concerning IPOs, 
disclosure, and foreign exchange control with regard to foreign takeovers, are so confusing 
that even a China law expert may have difficulties to sort them out.  The basic logic is that 
the Rules on Foreign Acquisition and Rules on Transfer of State and Legal Person Shares 
are the two main laws particularly with regard to foreign takeovers, with the rest being 
supplemental only.  As previously noted, the laws on M&A demonstrate strongly the 
dualist nature of Chinese securities regulations.120
Compared with previous M&A rules which are either prohibitive or very restrictive, 
117
 Title in Chinese pinxin: Liyong waizi gaizu guoyou qiye zanxing guiding.
118
 Title in Chinese pinyin: Waiguo touzizhe binggou jingnei qiye zanxing guiding.
119
 Title in Chinese pinxin: Shangshi gongsi gudong chigu biandong xinxi pilu guanli banfa.
120 See supra note 77, 78, and the accompanying text.
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the recently enacted regulations are rather liberal.  Yet they still show strong Chinese 
characteristics which are worth noting here.
First, national treatment to foreign investors is established.  Foreigners can directly 
buy shares of domestic firms from domestic shareholders or from new issuances of the 
firms (so-called “equity interest M&A”).  Alternatively, they can conduct “assets M&A” 
by setting up foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) and use the FIEs to buy assets from 
domestic firms, or by buying assets from domestic firms and then using the assets to set up 
FIEs.121  There is no percentage limitation on a foreigner’s shareholding in the target 
company or new company.  In addition, the laws do not differentiate foreign or domestic 
M&As in terms of rules on information disclosure and takeover procedures.122
Accordingly, a domestic firm acquired by foreign investors is not deemed as FIE and does 
not enjoy the normal preferential treatments afforded to FIEs according to the three major 
FIE laws.123
Second, in M&A foreign investors still need to comply with China’s state policies 
regarding the directions of foreign investment embodied in the Guidelines on Foreign 
121 See, Foreign Acquisition Rules, art.2.
122 See, State Shares Rules, art. 4.  See also FENG Henian, Waizi shougou shangshi gongsi guoyougu he 
farengu de xiangguan fagui he anli [Rules and cases concerning foreign acquisition of state shares and legal 
person shares], speech made by Mr. Feng, Deputy Director of the Legal Department of the CSRC, in the 
2003 Advanced Forum on Foreign Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises(August 20, 2003), available at 
http://business.sohu.com. 
123 See, State Shares Rules, art. 9.  The three major FIE laws are, respectively, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
zhongwai hezi qiye fa [The Law of PRC on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures], Zhonghua renmin 
gonghe guo zhongwai hezuo qiye fa [The Law of PRC on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures], and 
Waishang duzi qiye fa [The Law of PRC on Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises].
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Investment and the Foreign Investment Catalogue.  The Guidelines and Catalogue 
prohibits foreign investment in certain sectors such as production and research of 
transgenic plant seeds, exploration and mining of radioactive minerals, production of 
certain traditional Chinese medicines, and a variety of service areas.124  In some other areas, 
such as transport by water and railway, telecommunication, distribution services, etc., 
foreign control is restricted to less than 50 percent.125
Third, the rules encourage and even require mid- and long-term investment. 
Foreign investors can only transfer their acquired shareholding twelve months after they 
have paid up “in full” the consideration for M&A.126  The purpose of this provision, as 
stated in the leading principles of the Foreign Acquisition Rules, is to “attract mid- and 
long- term investment, prevent short-term speculation, and maintain due order in the 
securities market.”127
Fourth, the price of state shares and legal person shares shall be determined by way 
of open tender.128 More specifically, in a takeover process involving foreigners, although 
the parties generally can agree on the price, the Foreign Acquisitions Rules require that the 
parties shall base the trading price on the valuation made by assets valuation institutions.129
Curiously and confusingly, the Rules say that the parties “may by agreement choose asset 
124 See Foreign Investment Catalogue, supra note 108.
125 Id.
126 See, State Shares Rules, art. 7.
127 See id, art. 1(4).
128 Id, art. 3, para. 2.
129 Id, art. 8, para. 1.
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valuation institutions incorporated in China.”130  What causes confusion is the word 
“may.”  It is surely not clear whether the parties can agree otherwise as “may” is normally 
understood as non-mandatory.  However, practitioners who do M& A legal work in China 
understood the rules as “to require valuation by PRC valuation institution.”131  The law 
also explicitly prohibits transfer or sale of shares at a price “manifestly lower” than 
valuation which is deemed as “transfer of assets abroad in disguised form.”132
Fifth, employees of the target company shall be taken care of.  Contrary to the 
Anglo-American style of takeover which deems the matters relating to the unemployment 
of the workers of the target company an issue total irrelevant to securities regulations, 
China’s M&A rules impose a social responsibility on the acquiring foreign company in this 
regard.  In order for the authorities to approve a deal, an “employee arrangement scheme” 
with regard to the workers of the target shall be submitted as part of application package.133
The most interesting part of the recent M&A laws is probably the antitrust 
provisions, in which China asserts both domestic and extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
takeover activities.  In the case of domestic M&As, the foreign investor must submit a 
report to the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) and the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC) if (1) one of the parties to the deal has a business turnover exceeding 
130 Id.
131
 This can be seen from a seminar given by Thomas E. Jones on the topic Buying into China: New Avenues 
for M&A Transactions, on Nov. 7, 2003 in Singapore.  Mr. Jones a partner of the China Practice Group of the 
Hong Kong Office of Freshfields Bruchhaus Deringer.  The PowerPoint slides for the seminar are on file 
with the author and can certainly be obtained from Mr. Jones himself. 
132 State Shares Rules, art. 8.
133 Id, art. 12 and 15.
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RMB1.5 billion (about US$ 181 million) in China, (2) the aggregate number of M&As of 
domestic companies in the relevant industry of China within one year exceeds ten, (3) the 
China market share of a party to the M&A has reached 20 percent, or (4) the M&A will 
result in the share of the China market of a party to the M&A reaching 25 percent.134
China also asserts jurisdiction over global M&As if they have economic interests in China.  
Briefly, the parties to an offshore transaction shall submit a report to the MOC and SAIC 
for approval if any of the following triggers is met: (1) one of the parties to the offshore 
M&A has assets exceeding RMB three billion (about US$ 362 million) in China, (2) a 
party’s business turnover in China exceeds RMB 1.5 billion in the current year, (3) share 
of the China market of a party and its affiliates has reached 20 percent, (4) the M&A will 
result in the share of the China market of a party and its affiliates reaching 25 percent, and 
(5) as a result of the offshore M&A, a party to the deal will directly or indirectly hold 
equity in more than 15 FIEs in the relevant industry in China.135 According to a 
practitioner, these provisions, having worldwide transactional implications, are likely to 
make China the third major antitrust jurisdictions after the United States and EU.136
D.  Foreign Participation in Securities Intermediaries Services
Foreign participation in China’s securities business was once heavily restricted in 
China.  The OECD, in one of its reports on China’s capital market in 2002, depicted the 
situation as the following:
China’s restrictions on foreign participation are very severe …. In the domestic 
134 Id, art. 19.
135 Id, art. 21.
136 See Jones, supra note 130.
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capital market, foreign institutions are now effectively excluded from virtually all activities 
involving Chinese domestic investors.  Foreign intermediaries cannot deal with Chinese 
investors in domestic primary offerings, engage in secondary market trading of A -shares, 
and may not form investment funds or other institutional savings products that are 
marketed to Chinese residents.  Foreign intuitions are limited to soliciting orders for B-
shares from non-residents, with a Chinese partner required to complete the trade on the 
exchange.137
China’s WTO accession fundamentally changed the situation.  On June 1, 2002, 
half a year after joined the world trading system, the CSRC released two laws allowing 
foreign participation in securities firms and fund management business: the Rules for 
Establishing Foreign-Invested Fund management Companies (hereinafter the Fund 
Rules),138 and the Rules for Establishing Foreign-Invested Securities Companies
(hereinafter Securities Companies Rules).139
According to the Fund Rules, foreign companies can establish fund management 
join ventures either through purchasing shares of existing domestic fund management 
companies or co-establish new joint ventures with Chinese partners, both in the form of 
limited liability companies.140  A foreign party in the joint venture shall be a financial 
institution with good records (meaning it has not been seriously punished by the regulatory 
or judicial authority of its home jurisdiction in the recent three years) and with a paid-up 
capital no less than RMB 300 million (about US$ 36 million), in addition to any other 
137 See OECD, supra note 9, at 525-26.
138
 Title in Chinese pinyin: Waizi cangu jijin guanli gongsi sheli guize.
139
 Title in Chinese pinxin: Waizi cangu zhengquan gongsi sheli guize.
140 See the Fund Rules, art. 2.
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prudential requirement that might be raised by the CSRC.  It shall also come from a 
jurisdiction which has signed a “memorandum of understanding” (MOU) with the 
CSRC.141
The Rules also stipulate the percentage limit on the shareholding of foreign 
investors in the joint ventures.  In line with China’ WTO commitments, the foreign partner 
is limited to a 33 percent stake initially, but foreign ownership will be allowed to rise to 49 
percent three years after China’s accession to the WTO.142
The Securities Companies Rules have similar provisions allowing foreigners to buy 
shares from a domestic securities company or jointly establish a new company with a 
domestic partner (not limited to domestic securities firms) in the form of limited liability 
companies.143  The foreign partner, being a financial institution which has engaged in 
financial business for more than ten years with good records, shall also have good internal 
control system as well as good reputation and business performance in international 
securities markets.144  Needless to say, this kind of soft “requirements” place great 
discretion in the hands of Chinese bureaucrats in charge of the approving process.  The 
share percentage of the foreign partner in the joint venture is limited to one-third.145
A foreign invested securities firm is allowed to engage in a broad range of 
securities services, including underwriting of stock (for both A shares and B shares) and 
bonds (government and corporate bonds), brokerage of B shares, brokerage and self-
141 Id, art. 6.
142 Id, art. 8.
143 See the Securities Companies Rules, art. 2. 
144 Id, art. 7.
145 Id, art. 10.
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operation of bonds, as well as other businesses as may be approved by the CSRC.146
Compared with domestic securities firms, they are not allowed to provide brokerage 
services for A shares, and to engage in securities custody, buying and selling stocks for
their own account, as well as in consulting services. 
III. TRAPS FOR WOLVES: THE LEGAL 
PROBLEMS FACING FOREIGN INVESTORS
A.  Legal Risks Peculiar to the Chinese Stock Market
Investment risks exist in almost every capital market.  Entering into the Chinese 
market (and any market), foreigners are prepared to accept commercial and market risks 
such as price fluctuations, mistakes in corporate decision-making, change of fashion, 
economic recession due to cycles, as well as other uncertainties which are inherent in the 
nature of doing business.  These risks are not the subject of this article.  There are also 
legal and policy risks in a market that are to be incu rred as a result of changes in 
governmental policies and regulations.  Legal (and policy) risks are normal in a mature
market insofar as they are created in an environment in which the government merely play 
the role of regulator and nothing else (such as a significant shareholder), and the regulatory 
culture is consistent and coherent with a viable framework of rule of law.
Setting foot in China’s stock market, foreign investors wish to profit either from
trading stocks or from directly participating in the management of Chinese companies 
through mergers and acquisition.  The special features of China’s stock market have caused 
a variety of legal and policy risks which shall be characterized as systemic problems 
peculiar to China.  As previously noted, the stock market comprises substantial state 
146 Id, art. 5.
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ownership, with SOEs constituting the majority of listed companies.  In addition, two-
thirds of the shares are non-tradable.  In such a context, regulators of the stock market 
often face the “identity” problem, namely, whether they shall act as regulators of the 
market, for which they should treat all the parties equally, or as owner of state shares, for 
which their first priority is to ensure the realization of the multiple objectives of the 
government  in terms of both maximizing of state assets and maintaining social stability
even at the expense of the economic interest of other shareholders.  As a matter of fact, 
most paradoxes in China’s stock market are closely tied to SOEs. The vivid characteristics 
of emerging markets also present problems in connection to rule of law, corruption, poor 
corporate governance, and lack of a credit system.  In addition, the current laws place 
tremendous power on the part of majority shareholders while provide little protection for
minority shareholders.  Judicial remedies, while only emerging in this current year, are 
quite limited as well as restrictive.  As foreign investors will still only be able to hold 
minority shares in many cases due to various constraints, protection of minority will be a 
major concern.
The B Shares market can be used to illustrate some of the problems facing foreign 
investors.  Notwithstanding the many efforts used by Chinese regulators to boost it, the 
market is still far from attractive and has performed poorly so far.  Notorious problems in 
the market include the lack of liquidity, restrictions on foreign securities firms, lack of 
proper disclosure of information, and uncertainty of B shareholders’ rights with respect to 
the issuers.  First, under the B Shares Regulations, information disclosure documents of the 
issuers for B shares shall be prepared in Chinese.147 Although the laws state that foreign 
147 See B Shares Regulations, art. 17. 
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language version documents can be provided when needed, it is not required.148 This could 
be justified to the extent that investors should not expect documents in a language other 
than Chinese as they choose to invest in Chinese companies.  However, as the investors 
originally targeted are solely foreigners, provision of documents in a language they are 
familiar with should reasonably be the requirement; otherwise, it would result in 
inadequate disclosure because of language barriers.  Investors also lack trust in China’s 
accounting system.  While the B Shares Regulations insincerely stipulate that the issuing 
company may provide financial reports adjusted according to the International Accounting 
Standards or the accounting standards of the place outside China where the offer is 
conducted, reports produced are still unreliable because the overall reports of the company 
produced are based on China’s Enterprise Accounting Standards which do not inspire 
popular confidence so far.  In terms of shareholder’s rights, the B Shares Regulations 
explicitly offer the same rights to foreigners as their domestic counterparts.149 In addition, 
a foreign shareholder may entrust a proxy with exercising his shareholder’s rights on his or 
her behalf.150  However, this provision may not be meaningful because the regulations did 
not grant shareholders the right to pursue derivative action.  The absence of such a 
provision means that shareholders may not have a legal basis to sue directors and officers 
who have violated their fiduciary duties.151 Moreover, shareholders who intend to control 
a Chinese company through trading of B shares may be frustrated, because they are not 
148 Id.
149 Id, art. 5. 
150 Id, art. 21. 
151 See Jay Zhe Zhang, Securities Markets and Securities Regulations in China, 22 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com 
Reg. 557, at 615 (1997). 
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allowed to buy A shares which generally constitute the majority of total shares in a 
company.  All these serve as obstacles to bar the further development of the B shares 
markets. 
B. The Regulations and Regulatory Culture: Too Burdensome and Ambiguous 
to be Tolerable?
Any investor must face regulations and regulators, which jointly form the 
regulatory regime.  Regulators are tough and regulations burdensome – this is probably a 
worldwide phenomenon.  However, in advanced stock markets there is always a boundary, 
namely, regulators normally play the role of watchdog for the marketplace, providing rule 
of law and maintaining a fair, orderly, and transparent market.  For example, the main duty 
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to ensure the implementation of 
federal rules regarding disclosure, and in no case is it expected to be a guarantor of 
corporate profits.152  The uniqueness of the Chinese regulators (especially the chief 
regulator CSRC) is that they are designed to play multiple roles, in which being watchdog 
is the minor.  Briefly speaking, the CSRC is chiefly equipped with two tasks, including 
“developing” as well as “regulating” the capital market, and is expected to do both well.153
In addition, as a state agency, the CSRC and other regulators concerned (such as the PBC) 
are more or less considered as representatives for the state in taking care of state assets.
Conflict of interests and ambiguous identity caused by multiple roles of the 
152 See Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, in China Economic Review 
(forthcoming 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=424885.
153 See Zhao Wenguang, Gushi fazhan xuyao “liangzhi shou” tuidong [The growth of the stock market needs 
push from “two hands”], in Zhengquan Shichang Zhoukan [Securities Market Weekly](Sep. 22, 2003), 
available at http://news.sohu.com.
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regulators, in conjunction with lack of experience, have led to both under-regulation and 
over-regulation, as well as ambiguous laws.  In one sense, the CSRC is probably the most 
powerful regulator in the world, and China is the most heavy-handedly regulated 
market.154  Contrary to the belief of free market theory in most developed capital markets, 
China’s IPO market is dominated by the mentality of plan economy in which the 
government directly controls the IPO process as well as any follow-up issuance, 
determining which enterprise is able to issue shares. In fact, the CSRC views this market 
access authority as its main duty.  In addition, the CSRC is in charge of issuing licenses to 
intermediaries service providers including securities companies, accounting firms, brokers, 
fund managers, and securities consultants.  Even newspapers and magazines must have 
obtained licenses from the CSRC in order to publish statements of listed or prospective 
listed companies.  For a long period before 2003, lawyers needed to obtain licenses from 
the CSRC in order to provide legal opinions for companies with regard to securities.  Most 
of those licenses only have one-year duration so the CSRC is always able to kick anybody 
out of the market by withdrawing or refusing to renew license.155
Regulations in China’s stock market often go to ridiculously detail and specific.  
For instance, before the launch of an IPO, the CSRC sends personnel (called “preliminary 
interviewer”) to the company seeking listing to check its qualifications.  The preliminary 
interview decides all the material issues relating to IPO, including, among others, number 
154 See SHAO Yingbo, Guodu guanzhi daozhi de cuoche – Fang Liufang jiexi zhongguo zhengquan shichang 
[Frustration caused by over-regulation – Fang Liufang on China’s securities market], in Jingji Guancha Bao 
[Economic Watch Daily](Dec. 6, 2001), available at http://news.sohu.com/17/39/news147363917.shtml.
155 See id.
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of shares, price, timing of issuance, as well as choosing the stock exchange to list.156
When intermediaries are involved, the CSRC has detailed provisions as to how the 
underwriters shall proceed to “educate” their clients, the kinds of lawyers a company shall 
hire, which accounting firms shall be retained by listed companies conducting financial 
business … so on and so forth.157  Furthermore, self-regulation is almost non-existent as all 
NGOs in China’s securities market are de facto inferior subsidiaries of the CSRC.  For 
example, the two stock exchanges are no more than two departments of the CSRC, at least 
in the sense that their heads are appointed and their internal rules approved by the 
regulator.158
As noted by Prof. Fang Liufang of the China University of Political Science and 
Law, “guanzhi guodu” (over-regulation) is the major problem in China’s securities market.  
A direct result of it is that capital flow out of China to escape burdensome domestic 
restrictions through the setting up of offshore companies.159  Indeed, since 1990s, the 
amount of capital flowing out of China has been larger than China’s receipt of oversea 
capital.160  Ironically, although it is equipped with over-reaching regulatory power, the 
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 See id.  The paternal relationship is so strong that Mr. Gao Xiqing, the formal Executive Vice President of 
the CSRC, had to ask the securities associations to “speak against” the CSRC when it was necessary.  See, 
Gao Xiqing: Zhengquan ye xiehui keyi dui zhengjianhui shuo “bu” [Gao Xiqing: securities business 
associations could say no to the CSRC], in Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily](July 4, 2002), available at
http://business.sohu.com/90/47/article201994790.shtml. 
159 See SHAO, supra note 154.
160 Id.
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CSRC has no accountability to shareholders.  The official Xinhua News Agency recently 
claimed that the CSRC “should be responsible for the listing of unqualified companies, the 
falsification of financial statements by listed companies, joint trading of listed companies 
with their controlling shareholders, excessive speculation and insider manipulation.”161
Certainly neither the CSRC as an agency nor any of its individual officer has been pursued 
for responsibility.
Another risk resulting from conflicting multi-objectives of the regulators is the 
swaying and often unpredictable regulatory culture due to a change of the person in charge.  
The swaying culture is most prominent in recent years in the sense that certain chiefs of the 
CSRC prefer to play a larger role in “regulating” while others like to help “develop” the 
stock market with certain tolerance of fraudulent activities.  In February 2000, liberal-
minded Zhou Xiaochuan ascended to the chairmanship of CSRC.  With the assistance of 
Executive Vice President Mr. Gao Xiqing who was basically an America-trained lawyer,162
he began to transform substantially the Commission into a regulatory machine, with a view 
to establishing a “clean” market subject to clear rules and transparency and a powerful
regulatory framework modeled after the SEC of the United States.  For Zhou, the major 
task for the CSRC was to establish its role as an independent regulator rather than the 
representative of state ownership.163  Using the metaphor of football games , he stressed 
161 See Gordon G. Chang, China’s Equity Markets: Floating With Helium, in CATO Institution’s China’s 
Brief, Vol. 2, Issue 9, Apr. 25, 2002.
162
 Mr. Gao graduated from Duke University Law School with a JD degree in 1986. He became the CSRC’s 
Vice President in 1999.
163 See, Zhou Xiaochuan, Zhongguo ziben shichang de zuzhi jiegou [The structure of China’s capital markets], 
speech made in the China’s Capital Forum 2002(Dec.5, 2002), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn.
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that the regulator should act as a judge for all players, never attempting to go down to the 
greenfiled to play itself.164  Zhou’s commission focused its work mainly on enacting and 
enforcing disclosure rules.  In 2001 along, the CSRC introduced 51 new regulations and 
disciplined more than 81 listed companies and 10 intermediaries, including law firms and 
accounting firms, for violations for securities laws.165  The result was more than obvious: 
China’s stock market entered into the longest  bear period since the beginning of 2001, and 
has not recovered so far.  According to the statistics provided by the CSRC, from the 
middle of 2001 to the end of 2002, the stock market suffered a loss of RMB638 billion 
(about US$77 billion).166
The Zhou-Gao’s regulatory style, emphasizing on supervision and compliance, 
certainly irritated many persons who have stakes only in a bull market and even incurred 
the blame of many investors for their losses.  In addition, although supported by Premier 
Zhu Rongji, they had actually less friends among officials. In a 2002 stock market seminar, 
four former CSRC chairman coincidentally made speeches saying the development of the 
market should be priority under any circumstance.167 In December 2002, Zhou was moved 
to the position of the president of the People’s Bank of China (PRC’s central bank) and 
succeeded by Mr. Shang Fulin, a former veteran from the army.  Shortly after his takeover 
164 Id.
165 See, Feiwen Rong, Chinese Investors Dislike Market Regulation, at
http://journalism.berkeley.edu/projects/greaterchina/story-stock.html (visited Nov. 21, 2003).
166 See the database provided on the CSRC’s website at http://www.csrc.gov.cn.  In July 2001, the total 
capitalization of tradable shares China’s stock market was RMB1886.6 billion, which became RMB1248.4 in 
December 2002. 
167 See Rong, supra note 165.
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of the CSRC, Mr. Shang made it very clear that all the problems “are part of the 
development and shall be solved through development,”168 and requiring a “correct 
solution to the relationship among reform, development, and stability.”169  Needless to say, 
investors see another shift in regulatory culture, without being able to know the orientation 
of the next personality in charge of the CSRC.
Mr. Zhou’s perspective for establishing a clean market is certainly correct insofar 
as normal, developed stock markets are concerned.  The Chinese market’s uniqueness 
renders his efforts to model the SEC futile.  However, denying the positive role of Zhou 
still cannot solve the existing dilemma in China’s stock market: the absence of a set of 
clear and transparent rules and effective enforcement.  Failing such an achievement, fraud 
as the main theme of the market is unlikely to be changed irrespective of how big China’s 
stock market is “developed” to.
C. SOE Reform, Corruption, and Fraudulent Activities in the Market
In the words of Prof. Fang Liufang, “in theory, China’s Securities Law, Company 
Law, and the regulatory framework are strict enough to prevent any market fraud 
activity.”170 The reality, however, is very different.  Due to the structural flaws of the 
168 See SHANG Fulin, Tuijin ziben shichang gaige kaifang he weiding fazhan [To push the reform, opening 
up, and stable development of the capital markets], in Guoji Jinrong Bao[International Finance Daily], April 
21, 2002, at p.8, available at http://www.people.com.cn.  See also Shang Fulin, Jiji tuijin ziben shichang 
gaige kaifang he weiding fazhan [Actively push for the reform, opening up, and stable development of the 
stable market], speech made at the “2003 Forum for China’s Financial Reform and Development”, Apr. 20, 
2003. 
169 Id.
170 See SHAO, supra note 154.
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market arising out of initial design, massive fraudulent activities exist in both the first (IPO 
or new issuance) and the secondary (exchange) markets.  In 2001, Wu Jinglian, one of 
China’s most prestigious economists, proclaimed in a program of China’s Central TV 
Station that China’s stock market “is just like a casino, but worse than that,” because “even 
casinos have rules so that you can’t look at other people’s cards.  But in our stock market, 
many people can peer at the cards of others, can cheat, can practice fraud.  [In brief], 
market manipulation and insider trading have reached their extremity.”171
The root of the problem rests with China’s struggling SOE reform.  To reinvigorate
its cumbersome SOEs, China has tried several approaches.  In the early 1990s, 
concurrently with the drafting and passage of the Company Law, the government launched 
a new approach – “corporatization”, one aspect of which is to transform SOEs into listed 
stock companies.  As a programmatic document of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
stated, “The joint stock system is a form of capital organization of modern enterprises, 
which is favorable for separating ownership from management and raising the efficiency of 
operation of enterprises and capital.”172 From the government’s view, this approach 
presents several benefits. First, it expands the fund-raising channel for SOEs.  Second, 
SOEs can transform their operational mechanisms in compliance with the requirements of 
171 See Wu Jinglian nuchi gushi heizhuang [Wu Jinglian scolds fraudulent institutions in the stock market], 
interview of Wu Jinglian by the “Economy 30 Minutes” of the CCTV (Jan. 15, 2001), transcript available at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20010115/378998.html [hereinafter “Wu’s interview”].
172
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modern enterprises.  Thirdly, it helps to allocate financial resources to benefit SOEs.173
These optimistic predictions, if not complete daydreams, at least turn out to be one-sided
wishes in some sense. 
The name of many (and probably most) transformed stock companies fall short of 
their substance.  They have merely the corporate cloak of Western-style stock companies, 
but are still being run in the old way of administrative control. 174  For many SOEs, the 
main benefit from the transformation into joint stock company is not the opportunities to 
“restructure itself into a modern enterprises”, but rather to raise capital to alleviate 
financial difficulties.175  In order to obtain approval from the CSRC for IPO, they disclose 
false figures of profits or even forge financial reports.176  As stated by Prof. Fang in an 
interview,
When a SOE obtains a quota for IPO, even though it has suffered loss in the past 
three years [which hence cannot meet the initial legal requirement for IPO], it can 
immediately have profit earnings in the past three consecutive years simply by requesting 
those “securities accountants” to cook accounting statements for them, of course with 
extra high pay to those accountants. … The issuer’s “make-up” fee is eventually absorbed 
by the “issuance cost”, which shall be deducted from the capital contribution paid by 
173 Id.
174 See HE QING LIAN, XIANDAIHUA DE XIANJING – ZHONGGUO ZHI WENTI [THE TRAP OF
MODERNIZATION – CHINA’S PROBLEMS] (1998, Zhongguo Xiandai Chubanshe [China Today Press]), 
p. 24.
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
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investors purchasing the shares.  SOEs made-up – intermediaries provide make-up service 
– investors pay the bill: this is the entire process of the game.177
Because each SOE has a supervising body which is either an agency of the central 
government or local governments and which has a tremendous stake in the company’s 
going-public, the listing process is highly politicized, involving enormous rent-seeking 
activities and corruption.  The 2002-litigated “Macat case” is a telling one.  Macat Co. 
obtained approval from the CSRC and launched IPO in August 2000.  In November 2000 
the CSRC identified that Macat falsified hundreds of millions of dollars of profit and 
revenue in its financial statements.  According to the disclosed CSRC report and court 
judgment for this case, not only the company, a small entity without any substantial assets,
purposely cheated the public, all the intermediaries, including an accounting firm, an asset 
valuation institution, a law firm, and a securities company, helped fabricate the false 
statements.178 The case was characterized as involving a “sophisticated production line for 
producing false accounting reports and numbers in the securities market.”179 Eventually a 
dozen managers and professionals were prosecuted for violating the criminal law.180
177 See SHAO, supra note 154.
178 See Yu Ming, Wang Shuo & Ling Huawei, Maikete e’meng – yitiao kongqian wanzheng de zhengquan 
shichang zaojia liushuixian de wanzheng baoguang [Macat’s nightmare – a whole production line making 
falsified reports in the securities market is exposed to sun], in Caijing Magazine, March 20, 2002, 2002 Issue 
6 (general issue no. 56), available at http://business.sohu.com/39/60/article200406039.shtml and 
http://www.caijing.com.cn.
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According to a commentator, the massive accounting fraud perpetrated on the 
market in the Macat case was rather a phenomenon than an individual case.181  For both 
foreign and domestic investors, the quality of listed companies shall always be thought 
twice, as the disclosure reports provided by various intermediary service providers, which 
are supposed to serve as the “soft” regulatory infrastructure, cannot be trusted outright.
D.  Poor Corporate Governance: Listed Companies Too Dark to Be Visible
Corporate governance was suddenly brought into the landscape of China’s 
securities market in 2001 by the famous YinGuangXia case.182  Since then, this issue, 
becoming a high profile topic, has been placed at the very top of the regulator’s agenda and 
mentioned frequently in all the recent keynote speeches by the Chinese, ranging from the 
Premier to university professors.183
Poor corporate governance is still a problem caused by the inherent paradox of 
SOEs which constitute the majority of listed companies.  Because the government restricts 
the sale of tradable shares to investors, normally in any listed SOE the state owns at least 
two- third of the shares (including state shares and legal person shares), which are not 
tradable (and thus transferable to private investors by any means) as a matter of law.  This 
one-third privatization naturally leads to the prominent “one shareholder (the state 
shareholder) too dominating” problem.  Owners of the one-third tradable shares, composed 
mainly of dispersed individual investors, have no meaningful influence on the decision-
181 See LI Shuguang, Gusi zhili de shengtai weiji [Ecological crisis in corporate governance], in Caijing 
Magazine, March 20, 2002, 2000 Issue 6 (general issue no. 56), available at http://www.caijing.com.cn.
182 See, Standard & Poors Country Governance Study – Corporate Governance in China, Nov. 2003, at 1, 
available at http://www.standardandpoors.com (hereinafter the S&P Study).
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making process in the listed SOEs.184  In addition, China’s corporate and securities laws, 
understandably in the sense that they were made to protect state assets, place very strong 
power on the majority shareholder with respect to voting rights and corporate management.
The state is, after all, an abstract owner.  It must exercise its ownership through 
human agents.  Clarke thus correctly observed that “State-owned enterprises were thus 
always controlled, both at the enterprise level and at the level of the administrative body in 
charge of them, by human beings who did not own the enterprise.”185 Due to the absence 
of the effective ultimate owner (the state), power to control the SOEs rests in the hands of
appointed managers, which can only be monitored by competent government agencies.
When serious violations of securities laws or infringements of state assets are discovered, 
it is not uncommon to find that the state agencies either lacked the necessary supervisory 
capability or simply conspired (through corrupt officials) with the directors and managers 
of the listed companies to steal the shareholders’ property.
184
 And this shall be supplemented by another problem, namely, China’s investors have little sense of 
responsibility as shareholders.  Popular interest in purchasing stock has been overwhelmingly motivated by 
the prospect of rapid appreciation in market value, rather than by long-term analysis of the fundamentals of 
the company.  It is a well-known fact that 99% of private investors are oriented towards speculative profits.  
Investors rarely inquire into the stock issuer's economic condition, operations, or future prospects, apparently 
assuming that the government will not allow an enterprise to fail.  Dividends do not enter into the analysis 
and attention is directed solely to short-term fluctuations in price.  A report by Guangzhou East Market 
Research Firms indicated that, in a poll about shareholders sense of Guangzhou, about 50.6% of those 
investors stated that they had little or no knowledge of the operation of their companies. 43.7% stated that 
they never had the sense of a shareholder.  See HE, supra note 174, at 27.
185 See Clarke, supra note 152, at 6.
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The YinGuangXia case is the most influential one of this kind involving severe 
losses to thousands of minority shareholders due to almost non-existent corporate 
governance.  In May 2002, the CSRC issued a penalty report finding that, from 1998 to 
2001, YinGuangXia Co. fabricated sales receipts and disclosed false information about 
various production facilities that actually never existed.  The company lied to the market 
concerning RMB1 billion (about 120 million) in revenue and RMB771 million in profit.186
With this bright spot in the financial statements it led investors to believe it was the long-
expected “blue chip” in China’s stock market.  The sole purpose of all the 
misrepresentation was to induce investors to buy its follow-up issuance.  According to the 
investigation of the official Xinhua News Agency, since 1994 to 2001, YinGuangXia made 
three follow-up offerings and collected RMB574 million from the market, resulting the 
severe losses to thousands of small investors.187
One of the major reasons causing the YinGuangXia scandal was the virtual non-
existence of corporate governance in this literally state-owned listed company.  According 
to the Xinhua investigation, the meetings of the board of directors had always been done 
perfunctorily, with decisions decided by “core” people without transparency.188  The 
fraudulent activities were conducted by the CEO of YinGuangXia Tianji Inc. which was a 
186 See, Zhengjianhui xiada chufa jueding, ST YinGuangXia jiang zanting shangshi [CSRC issues penalty and 
trading of YinGuangxia shares will be suspended], in Zhengquan Shibao [Securities Time] (May 16, 2002), 
available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20020516/729584.html. 
187 See Xinhua News Agency, YinGuangXia zhuizong: 7.7 yi yuan de paomo shi zenyang chuida de? [Tracing 
YinGuangXia: how was the bubble of 770 million profit made?], by reporter He Jinsong and Han Zhenjun, 
May 26, 2002, available at http://www.xinhuanet.com. 
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wholly owned subsidiary of YinGuangXia and was the major revenue source of the listed 
company.  As noted by Prof. Li Weian, the Dean of the International Business School of 
Nankai University of China (in the city of Tianjin), the board of directors completely failed 
in certain aspects of corporate governance, including governance of its subsidiary and the 
corporate management.  In addition, non-state shareholders were entirely deprived of the 
right to monitor the board and the management.189
In the foreseeable future, foreigners still have to face the problem of poor corporate 
governance and the predominance of the “legal representative” of the state shareholder.  
Needless to say, their keenness in participating in China’s stock market, which the Chinese 
regulators see as an opportunity to restructure its SOEs and national economy, will be 
limited if the poor corporate problem is not solved.
E. Absence of Effective Judicial Protection of Minority Investors
Despite the enormous number of securities disputes regarding frauds, judicial 
involvement is so far limited and self-constrained on the part of Chinese courts.   When the 
YinGuangXia scandal and another fraudulent case (Yorkpoint Science and Technology Co.) 
occurred in 2001, hundreds of investors rushed to courts for help, and they were frustrated 
by the judiciary’s reluctance to process securities litigation.  On September 21, the 
Supreme Court of China released a notice requiring all the lower courts temporarily not to 
accept securities lawsuits concerning insider trading, fraud, market manipulation, etc, on 
189 See, Gongsi dongshihui nanci qijiu: Jingjixue jia tan YinGuangXia shijian [Economist on YinGuangxia: 
the board of directors is liable], in Shenzhen Tequ Bao [Shenzhen Special Administrative Region Daily](Aug. 
27, 2001), available at http://business.sohu.com/20010827/file/0092,023,100050.html.
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the ground of the “constraints created by the current legislative and judicial conditions.”190
A shock to investors, professionals and scholars (and certainly a comfort to some others), it 
fueled a debate on the rule of law and judicial role for the development of the securities 
market.  Yet if one’s thinking came down to earth the Court’s decision appeared 
reasonable and understandable, at least according to Mr. LI Guoguang, the then Vice 
President of the Supreme Court.191  First, there was an issue of lack of judicial coordination.  
As investors would initiate different lawsuits against the same defendants in many 
domestic jurisdictions, different lower courts would render conflicting rulings due to the 
absence of coherent criteria.  This would jeopardize the reputation and credibility of the 
legal system.  Secondly, the concern was about the overloading of the entire court system 
by individual securities lawsuits.  Thirdly, judicial in capability was frankly admitted, 
especially the lack of prior experience of judges, and the absence of national uniform 
standards as regards evidential rules and damage determination would only make things 
worse.  Finally, the concern was about the protection of state assets.  As indicated by 
Justice LI, “if there were to be numerous lawsuits against all these listed firms and if the 
private plaintiffs were awarded the rightfully deserved relief, it would lead to major losses 
190 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu She Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Anjian Zanbu Shouli de Tongzhi 
[Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on the Temporary Ban on Private Securities Lawsuits], FaMingChuan 
(2001) 406 Hao [Doc. 406 (2001) of the Court](September 21, 2001), text available at 
http://www.court.gov.cn.
191 See Zhiwu Chen, Capital Markets and Legal Development, Yale School of Management working paper 
(Sep. 12, 2003), available at http://icf.som.yale.edu/research/china-intiative.shtml. 
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of state assets (since the listed companies are mostly state-controlled).”192  Clearly, the 
socialist ideology of state ownership prevailed over justice for individual rights.
Four months later, a second notice came from the Supreme Court allowing Chinese 
courts to accept private securities cases concerning misrepresentation.193 It set up relevant
judicial standards and definition for “misrepresentation”,194 but confines courts’ 
jurisdiction only to this type of claims.  In addition, it preconditioned judicial acceptance 
of these cases on the prior penalty report of the CSRC establishing the facts and 
evidence.195  Arguably, this breached the principle of judicial independence guaranteed by 
the PRC Constitution and was alleged to be a re-writing of the Securities Law enacted by 
the country’s top legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC).196  Nevertheless, a 
wave of lawsuits flooded the courts after the promulgation of this notice.197
The most comprehensive judicial interpretation, Provisions concerning Civil 
Securities Litigation on Misrepresentation Cases [hereinafter the CSL Provisions],198 was 
192 Id.
193 See Zuogao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenchu Yinfa de Minshi 
Qinquan Jiufen Anjian Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on accepting civil
tort disputes arising out of misrepresentation in securities markets] (Jan. 15, 2002), text available at 
http://www.court.gov.cn. 
194 See id, art. 1.
195 Id, art.2.
196 See Chen, supra note 191.
197 Id.
198
 Chinese title: Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhenquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de 
Minshi Peichang Anjian de Ruogan Guiding, promulgated on 2 January 2003 and effective as of 1 February 
2003, text available at http://www.court.gov.cn.  
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released in January 9, 2003, obviously as a response to outcries of lower courts for more 
detailed procedural and substantive rules.  The CSL Provisions make no change to the 
confinement of private securities litigation only to misrepresentation cases, and affirm the 
requirement of preconditioning private lawsuits on the prior investigation and 
administrative decisions of the CSRC and other state ministries.  Investors in China’s 
securities market still have no judicial recourse for cases concerning insider trading, 
market manipulation, and other fraudulent activities, and they have to sue in the courts of 
the places where the defendants are headquartered and where local protectionism is a
prevailing concern. 
IV. PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER LIBERALIZATION 
AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE REGULATIONS: 
ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Having described the state of regulatory affairs of China’s stock market with 
respect to foreign investment and analyzed the legal problems facing foreign investors, the 
next step, logically, is to explore the prospects for the future of China’s securities 
regulations in this regard.  As noted by many commentators, there will be no future for 
China’s securities markets – and accordingly no future for the success of foreign 
participation in the markets – if those structural flaws and systemic problems are not 
solved.199  Given the strong paternalism in China’s securities markets, viable securities 
199
 In recent years, there is a common recognition among Chinese commentators that China’s securities 
markets have been marginalized in terms of playing a meaningful role in the economic development.  In fact, 
in an ongoing debate on the problems of the stock market, the meaningfulness of having such a distorted 
market has been put on doubt.  See, eg., YI Xianrong, Guonei gushi weihe bianyuan hua? [Why the stock 
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regulations should play a significant role in shaping a sound environment for the 
development of the market.  However, the perfection of China’s securities regulations with 
regard to foreign investment depends on China’s determination to honor its WTO 
obligations, a reflection of the role of foreign investors, repositioning the government in 
economic development, the advance of privatization of Chinese economy and, most 
importantly, rule of law and institutions building for the market economy.
A. WTO Compliance
A Member of the WTO, China is expected to comply with all the obligations under 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)200 in terms of financial services and 
has so far obtained mixed evaluations with regard to its performance.  As a WTO member 
who had struggled 15 years to join the multilateral trading institution largely due to the 
stern demands on market access from other GATT/WTO members and whose foreign 
economic relations are now primarily governed by WTO agreements, China’s compliance 
with WTO obligations constitutes the most important aspect of its bilateral and multilateral 
engagements with other countries.
market is marginalized?], and  YU Li, Quanshang zhi huan: Shoudu Jingmao Daxue Liu JiPeng Jiaoshou 
Zhuan Fang [Worries of the securities business – interview of Prof. Liu Jipeng of the Capital Economic and 
Trade University], both in Nanfang Zhoumo [Nanfang Weekly] (Sep. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm, and http://news.sohu.com.  In the second article, Prof. Liu stated: “It 
can basically be concluded that the capital market is in its most difficult, grim period since its inception 11 
years ago.  The grim situation does not lies in the fact that it is fundamentally a bear market.  More severely, 
we don’t know what’s the future of China’s capital market, and we are at loss, not knowing where it is 
heading to.” See id.
200 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1B [hereinafter GATS].
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GATS, part (and Annex 1B) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, contains two components: the first is the framework agreement setting the 
basic rules and the second a schedule recording each country’s specific commitments and a 
list of most favored nation exemptions. Pursuant to GATS as well as China’s WTO 
accession agreements, China undertakes the following three general obligations:
(1) Most- favored-nation treatment:  Members are required to “accord immediately 
and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no 
less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other 
country.”201  The objective of this provision is to ensure a WTO Member treats other 
members on a non-discrimination basis.  In China’s Accession Protocol it agrees to accord 
to foreign individuals and enterprises as well as foreign-funded enterprises “treatment no 
less favorable than that accorded to other individuals and enterprises in respect of (a) the 
procurement of inputs and goods and services necessary for production and the conditions 
under which their goods are produced, marketed or sold, in the domestic market and for 
export; and (b) the prices and availability of goods and services supplied by national and 
sub-national authorities and public or state enterprises, in areas including transportation, 
energy, basic telecommunications, other utilities and factors of production.”202 Apparently,
financial services, including securities services, are embedded in this commitment.
However, pursuant to GATS Art. II(2) which authorizes Members to make deviations from 
201 Id, art. II.
202 See Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Nov. 10, 2001, Accession of the 
People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, Part I(3) [hereinafter the Protocol].
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MFN obligation, China can accord particular countries less than MFN treatment as long as 
it has listed these deviations (called MFN exemptions) in its GATS Art. II Schedule.203
(2)  Transparency: Art III of GATS provides that each Member shall “publish 
promptly” all relevant domestic measures of general application which pertain to or affect 
the operation of GATS as well as international agreements pertaining to or affecting trade 
in services to which the Member is a signatory.204  According to its commitments with 
respect to transparency, China undertakes only to enforce laws that are published.  In 
addition, it agrees to provide to WTO Members, upon request, all laws affecting trade in 
services, and establish an official journal and entry point which make Chinese laws readily 
available to any individual, enterprise or WTO Member.205
(3) Fair application of laws:  Art. VI of GATS requires WTO Members to ensure 
that “measures of general application affecting trade in services are administered in a 
reasonable, objective and impartial manner.”206 This article is intended to prevent 
Members from denying, nullifying, or impairing GATS benefits to other Members through 
the use of onerous domestic administrative measures. In this regard, China commits itself 
to “apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, 
regulations and other measures of the central government as well as local regulations, rules 
and other measures issued or applied at the sub-national level pertaining to or affecting 
trade in … services …”207
203 See GATS, art. II(2).
204 See GATS, art. III.
205 See the Protocol, supra note 203, Part I(2)(C).
206 See GATS, art. VI.
207 See the Protocol, supra note 203, Part I(2)(A)(2).
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The above principles, covering all aspects of regulatory and administrative 
measures affecting trade in services, form the kind of general obligations that apply almost 
without qualification to all financial services activities, including securities services. China 
has also given a variety of specific commitments with regard to securities services.  Those 
commitments, although fully binding and embodying the principle of market access and 
national treatment, apply to a Member only to the extent that the country has made an 
affirmative commitment in their Schedule to be bound (the so-called “positive list”).208
Specifically, China allows foreign securities institutions to engage directly (without 
Chinese intermediaries) in B Shares business. They may also become Special Members of 
all Chinese stock exchanges.  Foreigners are permitted to establish joint ventures with 
foreign investment up to 33 percent within three years after China’s accession and 49 
percent thereafter.  From 2005, they can also establish joint ventures in China in the 
underwriting of A shares and in underwriting and trading of B shares and H shares as well 
as government and corporate bonds.209
Part II of the article can demonstrate that, according to “the law on paper”, China 
has enacted laws fully consistent with its WTO obligations.210 There is little doubt that the 
208 See GATS, art. 16, 17 and 18.
209 See WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, Addendum, Schedule CLII – The 
People’s Republic of China, Part II – Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services on Service (and) List of 
Article II MFN Exemptions, 1 October 2001, WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2 (hereinafter China’s Service 
Commitments).
210
 It shall be noted that China’s commitments do not contain obligations relating to opening up China’s 
domestic capital markets to foreigners.  They merely apply to measures allowing service market access and 
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“law in reality” will be significantly different as China’s policies are also exposed to 
interest groups politics, in which the lobbying power of international financial capitalists 
who have enormous stake in China’s honoring of its commitments plays a substantial role.  
The crucial question is that WTO has pose challenges to China’s traditional thinking on
socialist ideology of property ownership, country governance, relationship between the 
government and private citizens, as well as economic integration and globalization.  In 
essence, WTO accession and compliance provides the momentum for constructing the rule 
of law and civil society in China as well as reducing state ownership to the minimum 
(through privatization) insofar as social stability and controlling capacity of the ruling 
party are threatened.  The following sections will discuss the impact of WTO on China in 
these areas.
B. Rethinking the Role of Foreign Investors and Pace of Financial 
Liberalization
Policy makers and regulators in China are often obsessed with sovereign concern 
on the control of the national economy.  While they long for foreign investment and have 
successfully made the country among the largest recipients of foreign capital in the past 
decade,211 they have also taken tremendous precautionary measures preventing foreign 
control in Chinese companies, except in a limited, selected body of enterprises.  
Fortunately, this mentality, faced with challenges posed by both poor performance of a 
MFN and NT treatment, when obligated, to foreign service suppliers.  For example, permitting foreign 
enterprises to takeover Chinese SOEs is not included in China GATS obligations.
211
 In 1993 China became the second largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) after the United 
States.  In 2002, largely thanks to the “9.11” event which frustrated the confidence of international investors 
on the U.S., China replaced the U.S. as the largest destination of FDI.
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substantial number of domestic SOEs and economic globalization has been changing 
particularly in recent years.  Yet it might still be a very subtle issue in the sense that 
domestic sovereign and financial stability are legitimate concerns among the many nations 
of the world, and this is especially true in the context that it is often alleged that short -
term-profit-oriented international investors contributed to the 1997-98 Asian Financial 
Crisis.
Embracing foreign investors, however, is a global trend.  The OECD, in comparing 
the situation with China, notes that “All OECD countries have accepted the principle that 
foreign investors should be allowed to invest without limit in their domestic equity markets, 
although some countries make exceptions for certain ‘strategic’ industries.”212 Foreign 
investors, especially foreign institutional investors, can not only enlarge the investor base, 
but also contribute to the financial innovation in the domestic market.  They help the 
formation of good corporate governance culture by introducing “international expectations 
concerning disclosure governance and profitability into markets and so encourage listed 
companies to adhere to global standards.”213
One may argue that, literally, “international expectations” or global best practice, as 
mentioned above, might not be necessarily desirable.  However, in this particular context, 
there are at least two counter-arguments to refute this.  First, global capital flow, necessary 
for the development of any economy, is very sensitive as regards international standards 
212 See OECD, supra note 9, at 526.
213 Id.
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and more likely to float to the place where global best practice is adopted.214  Secondly, the 
content of global best practice per se is sufficient to instill confidence in the mind of 
international investors – namely, it dictates that “shareholder value is becoming an 
accepted standard by which corporate performance is assessed throughout the world.”215
The World Bank describes the overall benefits of foreign participation in developing 
countries’ stock market as the following:
Opening stock markets to foreign participation increases liquidity by deepening the 
pool of buyers and sellers. Price earning ratios rise as liquidity increases, making the 
market a far more attractive source of equity financing.  As the stock market develops and 
strengthens, it benefits other parts of the financial sector as well as the wider economy –
foreign direct investment accompanies stock market purchases, for instance.  Stock market 
development and banking development have a strong positive relationship, as do stock 
market liquidity and economic growth.216
There is still a crucial question of making a subtle balance because of the risks 
associated with global capital flow.  Financial crises in recent years suggest that foreign 
portfolio investors can play a key role in contagion of crises by quick shifts in capital flows, 
making the host economies more susceptible to volatility and sometimes causing their 
collapses.217  The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis was a vivid example.  Ironically, China 
214 See Jeong Yeon Lee, The Role of Foreign Investors in Dept Market Development: Conceptual 
Frameworks and Policy Issues, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2428 (August 2000), 
available at http://www.worldbank.org.  See also, WDR 2000, supra note 5, at 84.
215 See OECD, supra note 9, at 526.
216 See WDR 2000, supra note 5, at 84.
217 See Lee, supra note 214. 
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escaped the crisis largely thanks to the fact that its financial system was less liberalized 
than most of its Asian neighbors.  As noted by Nicholas R. Lardy of the Institute for 
International Economics, “China’s experience in the Asian financial crisis supports the 
view that premature capital account liberalization increases a country’s vulnerability to a
currency crisis.”218
There is little doubt that China will promote the orderly flow of foreign investment 
in its securities markets.  It is, however, important to stress that improvement and reform 
does not necessarily mean unfettered liberalization.  A financial crisis caused by over-
speculative capital markets is more detrimental and even dangerous to both the Chinese 
and world economy.  China’s problem is that its financial regulators (when regulating the 
capital markets) and its trade negotiators (when giving concessions for trade in services)
could not easily locate the right point of balance between liberalization and restrictive
regulation.  Probably for that reason, they are extremely conservative in certain aspects, 
such as allowing foreign investors to invest in China’s equity market, while tending to 
adopt bold liberalization measures in other aspects, such as a sudden acceptance of foreign 
takeover of SOEs without first solving a variety of problems (such as the proper valuation 
and pricing of state assets) which are prerequisite to the reform of SOEs.  China’s external 
commitments in services were also not a result of deliberation of the country’s “national 
condition”, a phrase Chinese officials often assert when faced with challenges with regard 
to policy legitimacy, but rather part of a liberalization package which has incorporated 
218 See Nicholas R. Lardy, The Case of China, January 2003, paper for the Conference on Comparative Study 
of Financial Liberalization in Asia, East-West Center (September 22-23, 1999), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu.
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many social, political, and self-interest oriented factors.  As observed by Lardy, “In its 
WTO negotiations, China’s Moftec negotiators made commitments in services without 
sufficiently consulting with the relevant domestic regulators.”219
China should continue to encourage foreign portfolio equity investment without 
undermining efforts in attracting foreign direct investment.  The distinction between A and 
B shares, which generates pricing distortions, should be abandoned. However, there is no 
need for China to rush to capital account liberalization until a general environment that will 
have appeal to foreign investors is established.  As a World Bank research correctly noted, 
“in sequencing capital account liberalization, the greatest danger is removal of most 
restrictions on capital account transactions before major problems in the domestic financial 
system are addressed.  Countries in which these problems are severe, but that choose to 
suddenly and fully open the capital account, run the risk of incurring a crisis.”220
It is fair to say that China has acted very prudentially and appropriately in many 
regulatory aspects.  For instance, it enhances the stability and controllability of the 
domestic stock market by requiring QFIIs not to repatriate their principal within a period
(according to Chinese law it is three years) and foreign companies not to transfer their 
shares within one year after their takeover of a Chinese company.221 However, China can
safely advance further liberalization on two fronts.
First, foreign institutional investors should be given more flexibility and larger 
freedom for portfolio investment.  While the QFII regime is a good start, the access 
219 See Nicholas R. Lardy, Problems on the Road to Liberalization, in Financial Times, March 15, 2002.
220 See Lee, supra note 214.
221 See supra note 103 and the accompanying text. 
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requirements are just too high and excessively cautious.  For instance, the business 
experience requirement (up to 30 years) and paid-up capital (US$1 billion) and managed 
assets (up to US$10 billion) requirement are higher than that initially taken by Taiwan, the 
pioneer of the QFII system.222  Tremendous amount of middle and small institutional 
investment firms, while equipped with excellent management experience, know-how, and 
dedicated enthusiasm in emerging markets, are excluded from China’s stock market.  In 
addition, the requirement that each QFII is only allowed to invest up to US$800 million 
will make the aggregate investment of institutional investors a tiny part of the total 
capitalization of China’s stock market.
Secondly, greater market access should be given to foreign financial service 
suppliers, including securities firms, investment banks, and fund management companies.  
While the number of China’s own securities firms (Chinese banks are prohibited to
participate in securities business due to a Glass-Steagall style restriction) has exceeded a 
hundred, which, in theory, could form a basis for fair competition, no best practice has 
been established due to massive fraudulent activities as well as the cheating culture.  Gao 
Xiqing, when he was the Executive Vice President of the CSRC, once indicated that every 
Chinese stock was manipulated by Chinese institutions, indicating that almost all securities 
firms and other institutions played a negative role in standardizing the market order.223 In 
another occasion, Gao said again that if he could exercise his free will, he would hire no 
Chinese fund management companies to manage China’s social securities funds and the 
222 See id.
223 See, Gao Xiqing renwei, gushi muqian wugu buzhuang [Gao Xiqing takes the view that “no stock is not 
manipulated by institutions”], Sohu Business, May 24, 2001, at 
http://business.sohu.com/44/52/article13745244.shtml.
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only reason preventing him from doing so was that the existing state laws did not allow 
this.224 His views on Chinese intermediaries were affirmed by CHENG Siwei, another 
senior Chinese official who said recently that violation of laws by securities firms was one 
of the major problems in the implementation of China’s Securities Law.225 One of the 
many pieces of evidence was that in the Macat cases discussed previously, almost all the 
intermediaries conducted serious frauds by helping to falsify documents.226  Given that 
most Chinese intermediaries are not so reliable, there is a solid reason to introduce into the 
landscape foreign competitors who implement international best practice in supplying 
securities services.
C. Redefining the Role of Government and Regulations, and Introducing 
Rule of Law and Institutions Building
In the days of the plan economy, Chinese government agencies used to control 
every aspect of the society, including the development of economy.  This tradition, 
together with the mentality underlying it, has persisted into contemporary days which 
could be characterized as a transition period towards a market economy.  As the country 
advances from plan to market, the role of the government shall also be transformed from 
224 See Ming Hao, Shebao jijin luzhan lubai [Social security funds repeatedly make loss], in 21 Shiji Jingji 
Baodao [21st Century Economic Report] (Aug. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/jj/20030821/cj/200308200606.asp.
225 See, Cheng Siwei: Zhengquan fa shishi zhong cunzai de wenti burong hushi [Cheng Siwei says that the 
major problems in the implementation of the Securities Law should not be ignored], Renmin Ribao [People’s 
Daily](Nov. 19, 2003), available at http://www.people.com.cn.
226 See supra note 178 and the accompanying text.
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the “instrument of the ruling class”, as the Communist ideology suggests, to a functional 
institution that provides good governance.  According to the World Bank,
Good governance includes the creation, protection, and enforcement of property 
rights, without which the scope of market transactions is limited. It includes the provision 
of a regulatory regime that works with the market to promote competition.  And it includes 
the provision of sound macroeconomic policies that create a stable environment for market 
activity.  Good governance also means the absence of corruption, which can subvert the 
goal of policy and undermine the legitimacy of the public institutions that support 
market.227
In China’s transition to a market economy, the government’s chief task is to 
provide institutions supporting the market through regulatory reforms.  Regulatory powers 
are centered on the system of law.228  “The foundation of a rule of law is built from respect 
by both government and citizens for the legitimacy of regulation, from high-quality 
regulations, from openness and clarity in the regulatory system, and from processes by 
which regulators can be held accountable for the contents of rules.”229 As a general matter, 
the government has the mission to provide a functional and enforceable legal and 
regulatory framework which meet the following objectives as regards financial and capital 
markets:230
227 See WDR 2002, supra note 2, at 99.
228 See OECD, supra note 9, at 368.
229 See id.
230
 For reference to the regulatory and legal model of mature markets, see e.g., Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 of the United Kingdom, chapter c. 8.  The following points were excepted from the 
author’s assignment paper in Professor Philip R. Wood’s class “Global Comparative Financial Law” when he 
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(1) To establish viable, predictable, and flexible commercial rules for the financial 
market and financial transactions.  In any event, private financial transactions 
should be the focus of financial law, simply because they constitute the foundation 
of financial markets.  Without prosperous and growing commercial transactions, all 
public/regulatory regimes would lose their sense and justification for existence.  
The commercial rules include those on contract, agency, tort, property, and many 
others.
(2) To protect investors and finance consumers (banking clients, securities investors, 
insurance policy holders) against the failure (insolvency/bankruptcy) of the service 
providers, against bad selling or advisory practices, often caused by conflicts of 
interests, and against risky products.  The underlying philosophy is that those 
investors are just like normal consumers, who are part of the public and should 
therefore be protected.  In addition, the damage caused to them because of failure 
or bad practice of service providers is usually more severe than normal consumer 
loss in any other commercial/consumer transactions.
(3) To prevent or minimize contagion or systemic risk of the financial market.  It has 
become a common phenomenon that, because of the enhanced linkages across 
national and international financial markets, the volatility of capital flows and the 
potential for concentrated disturbance are more easily and broadly transmitted 
across institutional groups or markets, thus triggering inter-market contagion and 
causing systemic collapse.  In the end, that will lead to financial and economic 
was studying at Oxford in 2002-03.  The author acknowledges tremendous thanks to Prof. Wood for the 
enlightening discussions with him on the topic of “goals of financial law.”
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crises, like those that happened in Mexico and East Asia.  Frankly, systemic risk 
has provided a major incentive for financial regulation.
(4) To safeguard the proper functions of markets and maintain investors’ confidence, 
including the smooth operation of markets, price transparency and proper 
information supply, mainly being the prevention of market abuses or manipulation
and insider dealing.  A related point is the provision of adequate clearing and 
settlement and custody facilities.
(5) To regulate financial intermediaries (service providers) as regards their conduct of 
business, integration, and sound reputation.  This is essential for financial laws to 
work as those intermediaries are presently the pillars of markets.  A related point is 
to create a fair competition environment for those institutions by creating a level 
plying filed for them and preventing monopolies amongst those intermediaries in 
the financial services.
As repeatedly stressed in this article, China’s regulatory dilemma is that, on the one 
hand, regulations are overreaching, overly-complex, multi-layered, often arbitrary and very 
interventionist, which lead to excessively high transaction costs; but on the other hand, 
many sectors of the market also suffer from substantial under-regulation, poor enforcement, 
and under-institutionalization, which lead to insufficient confidence in markets by 
consumers and investors.  In addition, the regulators, in particular the CSRC, undertake 
dual tasks, one of which is developing the market.  Especially in these days when the stock 
market has been undergoing the longest bear period, CSRC is under enormous pressure to 
“save the life of the market” (jiushi) by powerful interest groups including the many
Chinese securities firms.  It, however, should realize that, using a Chinese idiom, “yin zhen 
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zhi ke” (drinking position to quench thirst) provides no solution to the problem.  For the
regulators, there is no alternative to the safeguard of a general environment which ensures 
the reasonably accurate disclosure of information and a good corporate governance 
structure.  Regulatory “forbearance” might be inevitable in many cases due to the 
limitation of regulatory capacity; however, the regulators should by no means become 
accomplice of market manipulators, insiders, and other law-breakers.
Chinese regulators should also bear in mind that they are not omnipotent.  
Regulations should place increasing responsibility on market participants, emphasizing 
internal compliance, in-house risk management and governance systems and industry 
standards.  It is within the broader framework of institutions building to have private firms, 
industry associations and self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to undertake greater 
responsibility for the elaboration of standards.  In order to accomplish this, the key is to 
establish clear rules with strong incentives for market participants to positively play their 
roles.
A viable stock market, to establish institutions which serve as checks and balances
against abuse of public powers and instill confidence in international and domestic 
investors, should have an effective judiciary to ensure the proper application of the rule of 
law, rights of administrative procedure, and efficient dispute resolution regimes.  In China, 
the judiciary is rather weak and self-constrained in providing protection to investors.  
Within and without China, the consensus is that China needs a strong judicial system to 
safeguard the stock market and provide adequate dispute settlement mechanisms.  The gap 
of between different opinions lies in different views regarding Chinese judiciary’s capacity 
as well as socialist ideology (especially when the concept of “preventing the loss of state 
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assets” is concerned).  While the first concern could be solved as the experience and 
resources of the judiciary expands, the second can possibly remain in place for a rather 
long period until full-pledged protection for private property is established.  In addition, 
judicial reform, by nature, should be best focused on the creating of politically independent, 
difficult-to-intimate judges, and this can only be accomplished within the context of social 
responsibility.  Given the nature of China’s transitional political structure, it has a long 
way to go before true judicial independence is established.  Nevertheless, it is still possible 
to establish a judiciary which is keen on providing equal protection to both state and
private property, as social ideology is indeed diminishing due to recent reform movements 
initiated by the Chinese Communist Party with regard to SOEs and state-own assets.
D.  SOE Reform, Privatization, and Good Corporate Governance
It is repeatedly emphasized that a well-functioning stock market depends on two 
factors: a reasonably accurate information disclosure system and good corporate 
governance structure.   Corporate governance is centered on the idea that companies are 
governed with the aim of providing investors with a reasonable financial return and 
operators of the companies, acting within institutional constrains, manage them with 
integrity and responsibility.
Since corporate governance became a high profile issue at the end of the 1990s, 
China has made important strides attacking the problems during the last few years.  As 
mentioned earlier, the root of poor corporate governance lies in the intrinsic flaws of the 
SOEs management system, stemming from their complex, multi-layer ownership and 
control structures, dominating corporate management and shunning protection to minority 
shareholders, conflicting objectives, as well as from the ambiguous identity of the state as 
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an owner (shareholder) and regulator.  To enhance corporate governance, there is no 
alternative to the reform of SOEs.
For a long period in the reform era, the officially proclaimed guideline of China’ 
SOEs reform was “separating State ownership from corporate management”, with the 
intention to preserve state dominance and government control in the national economy.231
According to the blueprint on SOEs reform issued by the ruling party, the SOE managers 
should not be ideologically and politically qualified, be law-abiding, and have a deep sense 
of responsibility.  In addition, they should be familiar with the business they engage in and 
armed with modern knowledge of business management and even finance, science and 
technology, and laws.232  Indeed, the party was seeking angels falling to Earth (specifically 
China) from Heaven.  However, in many cases the quality of the persons they appointed 
fell far short, as evidenced by the numerous cases concerning management corruption and 
embezzlement of corporate property (thus causing the loss of asset in listed companies).
Agency problems lead to heavy loss of the wealth of both the state and domestic and 
foreign investors.233  With the retreat of the State from management of enterprises, the 
231 See Jiang Ze Min, Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-Round Advancement 
of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21 Century – Report Delivered at 
the National Congress of the Communist Party of China on September 12, 1997.
232
 The CPC Central Committee’s Decision on Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of 
State- owned Enterprises (Adopted at the 4th Plenum of the 15th CPC Central Committee on September 22, 
1999).
233 See e.g, Michael C. Jensen & William H, Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No.4, 305-360 (1976); Frank 
Eastbrook, Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends, American Economic Review, Vol. 74, 650-659 
80
State supervision of the management withdraws as well.  Some managers have treated 
State assets like their own private property.  Corruption thus rampantly emerged and 
received incentives from the absence of an effective ultimate owner.  Obviously, the major 
problems are caused by the ambiguity of the state-enterprise property relationship.  Clear 
ownership rights are fundamental to the market economy.  It can provide important 
incentives to use assets productively.  As Demsetz so stated, “property rights derive their 
significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations which he can 
reasonably hold in dealing with others. Without those expectations, people are unable to 
predict whether they will have a given set of assets at their disposal and are thus less likely 
to make the most efficient use of those assets. At a minimum, then, a system must parcel 
out some (or most) of the constituent rights of ownership into a bundle of rights which are 
clearly defined and legally protected.” 234  However, clear ownership by itself is not 
sufficient for establishing good corporate governance.  Insofar as ownership is concerned, 
an enterprise has what are known as “residual risk holders”.   In order for these risk holders 
to be willing to accept risk, they must (1) be compensated for holding that risk by being the 
owner (and therefore having control over the enterprise's operations and profit and loss 
distribution) or (2) be able to escape the risk by selling the right to hold it. The existence 
(1984); and Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 88, NO. 2, 288-307 (1980).
234
 Deborah Kay Johns, The State-Enterprise Property Relationship In The People's Republic Of China: The 
Corporatization Of State-Owned Enterprises, 16 Mich. J. Int'l L. 911, 923. (quoting Harold Demsetz, 
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347, 348 (1967)). 
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of either of these two conditions could lead to that the owners of the enterprise behave 
efficiently.235
Under the ownership structure of SOEs, the State legally owns all the assets of 
SOEs, and SOE managers are entrusted by the State to operate the enterprise.  This 
formula, however, rarely has the chance to achieve success.  First, the managers have no or 
little incentive to behave efficiently and to make profits for the enterprise because, at least 
literally under China’s current employment system, a manager’s compensation has little to 
do with his/her performance in managing the company.  Second, the managers have no or 
little responsibility for the failure or loss of profit of the company because the current 
system does not pursue a manager’s personal liability in case of failure of a company.  In 
fact, it is neither feasible nor fair to place such a heavy liability on managers given the low 
pay they receive as opposed to the normal income of private owners of enterprises.  The 
managers must be subject to effective external supervisions.   In a free economy, the 
shareholders are responsible for selecting managers of a company and those managers are 
accountable to them.  This formula, however, does not currently work in China, partly 
because the State is not well equipped with the necessary capability to supervise the 
management of every company, and partly because minority shareholders otherwise than 
the State are somehow consciously excluded from supervising management. 
The key to solving this dilemma is to gradually privatize the SOEs and relinquish 
government control over them.   In a society based on private ownership, misappropriation 
of corporate assets seldom happens, and the corporate managers have both the financial 
and personal incentives to behave efficiently.  The Chinese government and the ruling 
235 Id, at 924. 
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party CCP have realized that the privatization approach might be their last but nevertheless 
the best resort to solve the SOE problems.  On the 4th Plenum of the 15th CPC Central 
Committee on September 22, 1999, the CPC issued the Decisions on Major Issues 
Concerning the Reform and Development of State-Owned Enterprise, which, though does 
not contain the word “privatization”, implied the Party’s strong interest in this regard.   
According to the 1999 Decisions, the State will control only those industries relating to 
national security, public utility and natural monopolies, while withdrawing from other 
commercial industries.  It also calls for the development of non-public ownership that 
refers to the de facto private sector.  More revolutionary was that it allows the transfer of 
small and medium-sized SOEs (SMEs) to private citizens through merger, leasing, or sales.  
Finally, it mandates that failed SOEs must be diminished through bankruptcy and closure.
A much bolder move (called as “radical break” by the Washington Post236) has been taken 
in October 2003.  In the “third plenum” meeting of the Communist Party’s Central 
Committee, the ruling party passed a resolution with the most explicit language ever 
regarding opening greater door to private business. 237  Significant to the reform of SOEs 
and the development of capital markets are two decisions that are likely to fundamentaly
change the landscape of China’s corporate ownership structure.  First, the socialist 
ideology on ownership should be virtually diminished.  In addition to the call to give 
private business equal treatment and legal protection, it redefines “socialist public 
ownership” as “shareholders’ ownership” (Gufenzhi), saying this is the primary form of 
236 See John Pomfret, Chinese Leaders Endorse Property Rights, Washington Post, Oct. 15, 2003, at A17.
237 See Several Decisions of the CCP Central Committee on the Perfection of Socialist Market Economy, 
adopted by the CCP Central Committee in its third plenum meetings (Oct. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.people.com.cn (hereinafter CCP Decisions 2003).
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public ownership.  It also calls for a “mixed ownership” (hunhe suoyouzhi) which is 
characterized as owned by “diversified owners” (duoyuanhuo touzi zhuti) who can trade 
their ownership in a property market according to the “modern property system” (xiandai 
chanquan zhidu) proposed by the Decisions.238 Affirming the previously established 
principle that state ownership shall exist only in areas that “are vital to national security 
and economic lifelines, the Decisions explicitly permit private capital to invest in the areas 
of infrastructure, utilities, and other industries so long as no law prohibits it s entry.239 The 
implication is that not only state-owned SMEs can be privatized, big SOEs, especially 
those under the direct control of the central government, could also be sold to the private 
sector through “corporatization”.240 The second significant aspect is that it clarifies the 
different roles of the state as shareholder and regulator.  The recently established State-
owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is authorized to 
perform the function of the state owner, representing the state as shareholder in a company.  
Furthermore, the Decisions provide that the law should safeguard “the equal legal status 
and development rights” of all market participants, including the state owner.241
Conceivably, government agencies with regulatory powers like the CSRC should act only 
as regulators, treating public and private owners equally.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See TAN Xinpeng, Guoxi gaige: zou qiye duoyuanhua daolu – fang GuowuyuanFfazhan YanjiuZzhongxin 
fu suozhang ZHANG Wenkui [Reforming SOEs: the road is diversification of shareholdings – interview with 
Mr. ZHANG Wenkui, the Deputy Director of the Center for Development and Research of the State Council], 
241 See the CCP Decisions 2003, supra note 243.
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As stressed by Wu Jinglian, effective corporate governance for China’s listed 
companies could be established only after the predominance of state ownership is 
eliminated.242  The CCP Decisions 2003 certainly attempts to solve the problem.  The 
prospect is bright in the sense that the major obstacle in the past was the socialist ideology 
that mandated state ownership as a “forbidden area”, untouchable to the private sectors.  
To confirm this, the Minister of the SASAC stated recently that “very, very few 
enterprises” would remain wholly state-owned and predicted the country would enter a 
“peak period of mergers and acquisitions” because his agency and local governments have 
been granted the authority to dispose of SOEs.243  Apparently, orthodox socialism is going 
to leave China very soon as the wave of mass privatization has been heralded.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
International investors play a key role in major world capital markets.  China, never 
hiding its ambition to make its stock market one of the most successful on the globe, has 
recognized this in recent years.  To turn recognition into results, China has taken a variety 
of measures, featured with fancy terms such as B shares, QFII, and M&A, to attract 
international portfolio investment.  It had advanced very cautiously until very recently in 
2003, when it opened the door of the stock market boldly and widely to foreigners as well 
242 See, Wu Jinglian:”yigu duda” rengshi gongsi zhili de zhuyao wenti [Wu Jinglian says that “predominance 
of single state shareholder” is still the major problem in corporate governance], China News Agency (May 12, 
2002), available at http://www.Chinanews.com.cn.
243 See, Guowuyuan xinwen ban zhaokai “Binggou Chongzu Guoji Gaofeng Luntan” Jizhe Zhaodaihui: Li 
Rong, Huang Shuhe da jizhe wen [Press conference of the State Council News Office on “International 
Merger & Acquisition Summit Beijing 2003”: Interviews of Li Rongrong and Huang Shuhe by 
reporters](Nov. 11, 2003), available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn and http://www.China.com.cn. 
85
as to domestic citizens.  The objective is clear: China is seen as striving to swallow more 
global capital to excite its domestic market and to finance and privatize its ailing SOEs.
To achieve this objective, the key is to enhance the regulatory framework which, 
based on rule of law, can provide institutions supporting the market.  During the past two 
decades, Chinese authorities have been promoting a more effective legal and regulatory 
framework for the market and the nation’s corporate sector.  It is fair to acknowledge that 
important legal reforms have led to clearer rules for the transactional and contractual 
relationship, greater enterprise autonomy, and better corporate structures according to 
company laws.  However, certain structural flaws remain.  Due to the absence of liberal 
ownership ideology and effective institutions, China’s stock market is suffering from over-
reaching regulations, under-enforcement of laws, swaying regulatory culture, massive 
market manipulation and insider trading, as well as poor corporate governance and little 
minority investor protection.  The root to all the major problems is the SOEs.  
Predominance of the state shareholder in listed companies and less clear identity of the 
state as shareholder and regulator are the source of the flaws of the market.  With those
flaws, it is difficult for the market to attract international and even domestic investors.
To attack the root of the problems, China should strengthen the reform of its 
government, differentiating its two roles as assets owner and regulator and establishing a 
“Chinese Wall” between both roles.  Reforming the regulatory framework should make a 
balance between liberalization and stable development by rethinking the role of foreign 
investors, drawing on the experience of developed markets as well as of previous financial 
crisis.  It shall also take effective steps to improve corporate governance of listed 
companies.  The key to achieve this, however, is reducing the size and influence of SOEs 
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in the national economy, namely, privatization.  Only through privatization can it produces 
sufficient number of efficient and productive market participants.  Short of those qualified 
participants, China could succeed in developing a viable stock market simply by copying 
the system of laws and models which are alleged to be consistent with “international 
standard and practice.”  In short, the country needs to depoliticize its stock market by 
accelerating privatization (through putting state assets for sale) and enhancing protection of 
private ownership.  Moreover, since stock markets cannot stand alone, reform should also 
create a viable general environment that will have appeal to foreign and domestic investors. 
According to the World Bank, “this will require a wide range of supporting reforms to 
better protect creditors and investors and tighten up disclosure requirements, in addition to 
stable macroeconomic policies to raise saving and help develop the institutional investors 
need for good corporate governance.”244
244 See World Bank, World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market, Executive Summary, p. 12, 
available at http://www.worldbank.org.
